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ABSTRACT 
The first essay of this dissertation treats the question of ethical 
fairness towards future generations. It is argued that Harsanyi's equi-
probability characterization of the original position captures the notion 
of ethical fairness and that the result of applying this model to a future 
generations context and also satisfying the axioms of the expected utility 
theorem results in classical utilitarianism being chosen. This is in 
contrast to the average utilitarianism which is widely thought to be the 
more plausible utilitarian position in a short run framework. It is also 
argued that classical utilitarianism does not entail a situation where 
individuals would exist at a subsistence level as some (Parfit) have 
assumed. 
The second essay is an efficient market test of the real estate 
market. The question of whether lagged real interest rates contain 
statistically significant information about future housing prices is 
examined . It is found that the coefficients of lagged real rates of twelve 
and eighteen months were negative and statistically significant; thus 
efficiency is rejected . A Hausmann test was then run to see if il was 
permissible to use an ordinary least squares approach; such an approach 
was valid . 
The third essay examines the effect of inflation on rates of return in 
different socieo-economic areas. Measures of expected and unexpected 
inflation are defined. The rates of return from holding real estate in 
different areas are then regressed upon the measures of expected and 
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unexpected inflation. A Chow test was then run to see if it was 
permissible to pool the coefficients of expected and unexpected inflation. 
The pooling is permissible and so we can say that in a statistical sense, 
infiation had the same impact upon the different areas . 
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FUTURE GENERATJONS, THE ORIGINAL POSITJON, AND CLASSICAL UTIIJTARIANISM 
Many of the public policy options that confront us in various areas 
have costs and benefits that arrive in the future. The costs of disposing 
of nuclear waste or hazardous chemicals are future costs which will have 
to be borne by future generations. Similarly, when we deplete non-
renewable resources, the opportunity cost of not having the resources 
available will have to be borne by future generations. In deciding public 
policy questions about such issues, to what normative standard are we to 
appeal? 
I will answer this question within a contractarian framework , and 
since the motivation for this framework has been discussed at length 
elsewhere, I will touch upon it only briefly here. 1 In the hypothetical 
contracting situation, individuals are deprived of all information about 
their particular situation, e.g. about their specific preferences, sex, race, 
religion, etc . This ignorance is dictated by the two pre-theoretical 
intuitions which motivate the adoption of a contractualist framework --
(1) impartiality and (2) autonomy. 
( 1) Imparti ality r egarding choice of the principles which are to 
govern society follows from the fact that since people don't know the 
particulars of their own situation, they can't possibly be partial to them. 
(2) Autonomy of choice follows in the same way: since the contingent 
facts of our own situation are unknown they cannot influence us. We will 
be free from what Kant called heteronomous influences due to our lack of 
knowledge of the contingent facts . 
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This notion of autonomous choices can be seen as being compatible 
with physical determinism; this notion does not require us to repeal the 
first and second laws of thermodynamics .2 Rather the notion of 
autonomous choices can be seen as being compatible with physical 
determinism if the choices are determined under appropriate 
circumstances. These circumstances are those which would not cause an 
individual to be influenced by the particular contingent facts of his own 
existence. And since an individual is deprived of knowledge of these 
particular facts, he can't possibly be influenced by them. 
Since an individual does not know what his particular position in 
society will be, the choice of principles in the original position can be 
thought of as a choice between uncertain prospects. The prospects are 
the different positions in society and the different temporal societies an 
individual might occupy. Let us say that there are n individuals in society 
and m different time periods in which an individual might occupy them. 
There are thus m x n positions an individual might occupy. Since an 
individual is ignorant of which society he will live in, and what his position 
in society will be, he "\\ill assign each prospect the probability 1 /(m x n). 
Now it follows from the Marschak postulates that when an individual 
chooses a social state under these conditions. he -will pick that one which 
maximizes the arithmetical mean. For if an individual's choices satisfy 
the Marschak postulates. then he behaves as ii he were maximizing his 




U(A) = (1/(m x n)) 2: Uj(A) 
j=l 
This is so because an individual would have 1/(m x n) chance of being put 
in that place of each individual j(j = 1, ... m x n) and hence of obtaining 
the utility amount Uj(A), i.e. j's utility in situation A. Thus individuals in 
the original position will choose the moral principle requiring us to 
evaluate each social situation A in terms of the long run average utility 
that the n x m members of society would enjoy in this situation. Social 
policies would then be ranked according to their ability to produce 
desired social states (as defined by their average utility level). 
The proposal outlined above is the straightforward extension of 
Harsanyi's 19553 powerful argument to a society which exists through 
time. Harsanyi considered a society of n individuals all of whom exist 
contemporaneously; above I considered n individuals who exist in m 
successive time periods. This characterization seems the most natural 
first attempt to extend a contractarian framework to a future 
generations context .4 But it is unsatisfactory as it stands, and for two 
main reasons. 
First, the number of people and the number of societies should not 
be thought of as exogenously given. Rather, they are part of the problem 
we are investigating because they will be to a large extent determined by 
our actions . Thus it is a mistake to specify the problem by assuming, as 
we have so far done, that there are m x n people (since there are m 
people in each period and n different time periods). The number of 
people in each period will be determined to a large extent by the 
institutional arrangements regarding birth control, abortion, free 
education, health care, etc., which as they vary cause there to be more or 
less than m people in each society. Similarly, the number of different 
societies will be determined by actions we take. If a current generation 
decides to solve the problems of chemical disposal, nuclear waste 
disposal, or arms control in risky ways, the number of periods may turn 
out to be far fewer than n . There is thus a problem of self-referentiality: 
appeal to the original position is supposed to guide our actions, but our 
actions affect the original position as it has so far been formulated . 
The fact that the number of people in each generation and the total 
number of generations is not independent of our actions vitiates any 
straightforward use of the expected utility theorem such as the kind we 
had in mind in our straightforward extension of Harsanyi's theorem. For 
one of the axioms of the expected utility theorem is that the states of 
nature are independent of one's actions . In assessing the action of 
planting seeds, for example, we are to look at how probable the chances 
of rain or sun are . The likelihood of the states of nature -- in thi s case , 
rain or sun -- a re rightfully taken to be in dependent of our actions . This 
is not so in the case we are considering, however. For here the 
probability of being placed in the position of any state of nature is 1 I (m 
x n) and this is surely dependent upon our actions. This dependence of 
the states of nature upon our actions seems a decisive logical reason why 
Harsanyi 's theorem cannot straightforwardly be applied to a future 
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generations context. 5 
The second main problem with the straightforward extension of 
Harsanyi's theorem to a future generations context is that this extension 
violates a consistent application of the impartiality constraint motivating 
the adoption of a contractualist framework. Thus the second is a moraL 
rather than a logical objection. In the above specification of the 
contractualist framework it is implicitly assumed that we already exist 
and we are asked to pick principles, given that we do not know who we 
are. The mere fact, however, that we exist and know that we do, is 
morally relevant infm;mation which affects the choice of principles in the 
original position. Knowing that I exist, I will be concerned only with 
improving the quality of life of already existing people -- providing, of 
course, that I act as a rational agent in the original position is supposed 
to act. My knowledge that I already exist (or will definitely exist in the 
future). however. is akin to knowing, e.g ., that all people in the original 
position are Caucasian. If the parties knew this, and then acted as 
rational agents act, they would then select institutional principles which 
maximize the average utility of Caucasians in society. One would 
naturally object that the choice of principles is biased by the 
informational assumption that all individuals in the original position are 
Caucasian. A similar bias is introduced by the knowledge of all parties in 
the original position that they will exist in the present or future societies. 
In a word, choice of principles is biased by including morally prejudicial 
information. People who might exist under different institutional 
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arrangements are given no say in the formation of the background 
institutions of society. These individuals are left out in the cold the way 
non-Caucasians would be left out were all parties in the original position 
told that they were Caucasians. 
One might object that there is a misplaced analogy about being 
unbiased towards existing people such as non-Caucasians (who will 
definitely be harmed by including prejudicial information into the 
original position) and non-existent people who will not be harmed 
(because they don't exist) if they are not brought into existence; in the 
first case, actual existing people will be made unhappier and worse off 
while in the second case, no one will be made worse off because these 
potential people don't even exist. 
The problem with this objection is that it appeals to a notion of 
existing people that is supposed to be well defined independent of our 
actions. We can't without circularity say that the non-existing people will 
be no worse off because whether these potential people are non-existing 
or not depends upon our actions and we as yet have not determined what 
is the morally correct action to take. Thus the objection about there 
being a morally relevant difference between (allowably) including 
information about existing people versus (not allowably) including 
information about whether people do exist fails because the 
"information'' about whether people exist is determined by our choice of 
actions and this has not as yet been determined. 
To summarize, then, there are two main problems with the 
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straightforward extension of the single period contractualist framework 
to a future generations contractualist framework: first, the number of 
people and periods isn't even well defined in the straightforward 
extension because the number of people and periods is dependent on our 
own current actions and yet we aren't told how many people or periods to 
produce but only told that m individuals and n periods exist; thus one of 
the axioms required for the expected utility theorem is not satisfied and 
so the theorem cannot be applied to achieve a straightforward extension 
of Harsanyi's theorem. Second, the straightforward extension biases the 
choice of principles by having the members assume that they will exist 
regardless of the principles chosen. 
It seems that a more sophisticated way to model a multi-
generational contractarian situation would be to assume that the 
number of people and generations is allowed to vary depending upon the 
institutional principles chosen and can vary between 0 and some large 
but finite number. It seems plausible that there are some obstacles of 
nature which would prevent the infinite continuation of the species, e.g., 
the sun will burn out so many years in the future . It does not seem 
objectionable to take the number of people as exogenously given in the 
weak sense that there are certain natural and technological forces 
preventing the infinite perpetuation of the species . Some of these 
seeming absolute constraints could be overcome by, e .g ., sending people 
to other galaxies to exist even after the sun burned out but perhaps all 
could not be so overcome. At any rate, to simplify the analysis, it will 
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here be assumed that the choice of principles is subject to broad 
exogenously given natural forces and technological forces which serve to 
keep the number of possible people finite. This is largely an assumption 
made for the sake of convenience and I don't think it would change the 
analysis if the possible population was allowed to be infinite. 
Let the exogenous limit on the maximum number of people the world 
could possibly support equal Q. Let the number of generations which 
result from the choice of principles in the original position be R and the 
number of people in each generation be S (we'll assume for the sake of 
simplicity that the number of people in each generation is the same). R x 
S must thus be less than (or possibly equal to) Q. A given social policy A 
now yields an individual in the original position the expected utility 
(S z~)(A) 
W(A) = (1/ Q) ~ Uj (A) 
j=l 
since an individual in the original position would have chance 1 /Q of 
being in the place of one of the S x R members that policy A causes to 
exist. This principle would have individuals in the original position rank 
social policies according to their ability to result in the highest average 
utility of all individuals that would exist conditional on the policies 
chosen. In effect it amounts to the classical utilitarian position of 
seeking to produce the maximum amount of happiness because since the 
number of individuals is constant in the original position (Q), the greatest 
average happiness of people in the original position is produced by 
producing the greatest amount of total happiness in the real world 
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(outside the original position) . 6 
It is permissible to use the expe.cted utility theorem and apply it to a 
multi-generational context in the way we have above because the states 
of nature as now defined are independent of our actions. There are now 
taken to be Q states of nature where Q is the maximum number of people 
the world could possibly support. Q is thus exogenously given and is 
independent of our actions. The axioms of the expected utility theorem 
are thus satisfied and so it is permissible to appeal to it in establishing 
our result of classical utilitarianism. It does seem rather surprising to 
me that when the logical objection of the dependence of the states of 
nature upon our actions is removed, which at the same time removes the 
moral ·objection about the partiality of information in the original 
position, the strikingly different conclusion of the classical utilitarianism 
rather than average utilitarianism results from the original position. 
The conclusion that the classical utilitarian position of producing 
the greatest amount of happiness possible would be chosen in the original 
position contrasts with the claim Rawls makes when he says that the 
original position construction serves to highlight the differences between 
classical and average utilitarianism: 
From the standpoint of the persons in the original position, it 
would appear more rational to agree to some sort of floor to 
hold up average welfare. Since the parties aim to advance their 
own interests, they have no desire in any event to maximize the 
sum total of satisfaction. I assume, therefore, that the more 
plausible utilitarian alternative to the two ~rinciples of justice is 
the average and not the classical principle. 
The reason Rawls is led to believe that the original position construction 
favors an average utilitarian position which is at odds with a classical 
position is because he does not follow the methodology of the original 
position rigorously enough. He has all individuals assume that they will 
exist no matter what policies are followed which naturally biases the 
decision process in favor of an average utilitarian view. A more rigorous 
following of the original position. however, results in the conclusion that 
the average utility of all possible people would be maximized; and as has 
been pointed out above, this is equivalent to maximizing total happiness 
since the denominator Q is constant across possible policies .8 
FURTIIER CONSIDERATIONS 
The argument presented in the first section needs to be checked for 
the intuitive appeal of its consequences; otherwise if the consequences 
are too unintuitive, we might just reject the reasoning or premises which 
led to our conclusion. One might also reject the original position 
framework if one thought the conclusion was too counter-intuitive . 
One initially intuitively appealing solution to the problem of 
intergenerational justice is that of equal opportunity for all 
generations. 1 0 This standard says that justice requires that all future 
generations be provided with a resource base that allows them the same 
opportunity earlier generations had. This standard also does not imply 
that individuals might sometimes be required to have children to 
increase happiness even if they don't want them so it may seem 
intuitively superior on that score to the total utilitarian position of part I. 
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Though the equal opportunity standard has the above mentioned 
strengths, it also has certain drawbacks . First, as an internal criticism, 
the standard should probably be modified so that it focuses upon the 
capital stock and technological expertise as well as the natural resource 
base. If a later generation had fewer natural resources than an earlier 
one, but a significantly larger capital stock and technological expertise, it 
would seem that the equal opportunity standard should say that they 
were justly treated. 
Second, and more importantly, the equal opportunity standard 
suffers from the same distributional implausibilities that have plagued 
Rawls' difference principle. Imagine that it was extremely costly to 
maintain the resource base after a certain point in time . If the resource 
base was depleted according to one plan the people in the year 2100 
would have utility 100 and those in the year 2150 would have utility 10. 
However if we -wish to fulfill the equal opportunity standard we would have 
to follow a plan (if one existed) which would yield the generation of the 
year 2100 a utility of 11 and the same utility for generation 2150. This 
seems an implausible restriction. Rather it seems more plausible to 
follow the ut ilitarian position of favoring equali ty insofar as it is reflected 
in people's utility functions due to diminishing marginal utility but not to 
give it the absolute weight that the equal opportunity standard does. 
Third, to be plausible the equal opportunity standard must be 
interpreted relative to some population base. That is, consider if no one 
wanted to have children in later generations. If this happened it would be 
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foolish to keep the resource base intact for them. Similarly, if the 
population was going to be much larger in the future, the resource base 
would have to be much greater. The size of the population in the future 
will be to a large extent dependent on the actions of people today and yet 
the equal opportunity standard does not give us any guidance on this 
question. Thus the standard is fundamentally incomplete as a standard 
of justice for future generations since it is logically dependent upon the 
size of the future population which in turn depends upon our actions and 
yet the equal opportunity standard does not give us any guidance about 
how many people to produce. 
One response the equal opportunity standard advocate might make 
is to say that the standard is indifferent as to the population base as long 
as each individual throughout history has equal opportunity. We can 
wonder, however, why the standard should not favor the creation of 
another person if this person will have a worthwhile life . That is, why 
shouldn't the standard be moved from indifference about the population 
base (as long as there is equal opportunity) to strict preference? And if 
we decide to opt for a theory which says that we should strictly prefer the 
larger popluation, doesn't it seem permissible to opt for this larger 
population if it will only cause a very slight decrease in the resources 
available for future generations? We will turn to these questions as we 
examine the positive intuitive attractions of a classical utilitarianism 
position. 
Although the equal opportunity standard does not seem as appealing 
upon reflection as it initially did, we still must check upon the appeal of 
the proposal put forward in the first part. It must be considered whether 
the conclusion of the deductive argument is in accord with our 
considered judgements about these matters; and if it is not initially in 
accord with our judgements, we must see whether our judgements are 
changed upon reflection. One intuitive argument which can be made in 
favor of a total utilitarian view is to consider our intuitions about what 
would be the right course of action if individuals in a society were 
perfectly indifferent about whether to bring about an increase in 
population via the birth of a child. If they were so indifferent, doesn't it 
seem intuitively plausible to think that the proper course of action would 
be to have the child if this child would lead a happy life? The argument 
would then say that even if the people have a mild preference for not 
having the child, if the gain in utility to the child (or children) is great 
enough, the correct course of action would be to have the child. The 
utilitarian would then seek to guide this balancing by appealing to 
considerations of total utility. Considerations of average utility couldn't 
guide the balancing because by hypothesis it is admitted that sometimes 
it is better lo have a child even if having the child will result in a lower 
level of average utility (if existing individuals have only a mild preference 
against having the child and the child will only be brought up to the 
former average utility level). Hence unless our intuitions are to make 
this judgement unguided by any rule, we will have to appeal to a total 
utilitarian rule . In essence, a variation of the argument that Sidgewick 
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used so persuasively so many years ago. 
This appears to be the sort of argument that Derek Parfit uses and 
calls the "mere addition" argument. Parfit asks us to consider a 
situation where a group of people could be added to the population at a 
lower level of utility than the people than the people already in the 
population. These additional people would not cut into the resources of 
the previously existing people or lower their utility in any way. They 
would, however, lower the average utility of society since they are added 
to the population at a level that is lower than the average . Parfit's mere 
addition example compellingly illustrates the implausibility of an average 
utilitarian vieVv-point vis-a-vis a total utilitarian in certain situations; if 
these additional individuals will have lives that are worth living, and they 
won't harm the people already living, it does seem rather implausible not 
to add them to the population just because they will lower the average 
utility. 
However, the logic of the mere addition argument and some other 
assumptions which Parfit considers rather plausible, lead him to a 
conclusion which he considers repugnant. Parfit observes that if one 
assumes an egalitarian vieVY-point, then a society B (in which the utilities 
of newly added people are combined and averaged with the utilities of the 
people who already existed) is superior to the former society A (with the 
higher utilities of the formerly well off separated from the lower utilities 
of the newly added people). Parfit observes that if one favors equality as 
a goal this new society should be preferred to the inegalitarian one which 
separated the old and newly added groups. However if we continue this 
line of reasoning, we realize that this newly formed egalitarian society 
should be able to be improved upon by adding new people who are at a 
lower level of utility and yet whose addition doesn't harm these people; 11 
and this society could be improved upon by a more egalitarian one, etc., 
etc. The conclusion is the repugnant conclusion that any society with a 
certain amount of people can be improved upon by another society with 
sufficiently additional amounts of people. Parfit weakens this statement 
to saying that the new society with sufficiently more people can't be 
judged worse off than the old society to arrive at his new repugnant 
conclusion: 
THE NEW REPUGNANT CONCLUSION: For any possible and large 
population, say of eight billion, all with a very high quality of 
life, there must be some much larger imaginable population 
whose existence, other things being equal, would not be worse, 
even though its mewers have lives that are not much above 
the Restricted Level. 
Parfit tells us the restricted level is one at which lives "are worth living 
but are gravely deprived, crimped and mean -- not much above the level 
where it would be intrinsically bad that these people are alive ." He thus 
argues that the logic of following a total utilitarian view (as given in the 
"mere addition argument"), along with an assumption of egalitarianism, 
leads to the repulsive conclusion that we can't rule out a society with 
many more people than ours but whose members have lives that are 
barely worth living. Parfit's argument, if successful, might lead us to 
rethink the line of reasoning which leads to the total utilitarian view 
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proposed earlier. 
A difficulty in Parfit's argument is that it is not clear how the "must" 
in the statement of the repugnant conclusion is to be interpreted. When 
he says that there must be some larger population which would not be 
worse than the previous one -- even though its members all have lives not 
much above the restricted level -- it is not clear whether he means the 
"must" as an empirical or logically possible "must." If the argument is 
that it must empirically be possible to increase the total happiness of any 
society by adding more people until these people reach the restricted 
leveL then the argument seems false. In order to reach the maximum 
amount of happiness, the amount of people should be increased until the 
loss in individual utility more than offsets the gain in utility from the 
extra individuals now existing. As economists we would say that to 
maximize happiness the number of individuals should be increased to the 
point where the marginal happiness curve is 0. Beyond this point, any 
increase in individuals causes happiness to decrease . Similarly, it is false 
to say that it is possible to merely add people beyond this point without 
harming others because as total happiness will be less, the pre-existing 
people will also be worse off. The situation is analogous to a monopolist 
seeking to maximize total revenue; the monopolist increases production 
to the point where the gain from selling an increased unit is exactly offset 
by the loss in price in the previously existing units (or more precisely, in 
individuals higher up on the demand curve who are buying at the same 
time). Seen in this way it is just empirically false to say that beyond this 
17 
point (where the marginal happiness of individuals is 0) it is possible to 
increase total happiness by adding more people. The mere addition 
argument fails because beyond the point where the marginal of happiness 
of individuals is zero, people can't be added to the population without 
harming the utility of other people in the population. Beyond this point, 
any further increases in population harm already existing people and will 
also decrease total happiness. 
Parfit seems to have in mind a situation where the marginal 
happiness curve never falls below 0. In the graphs on the following page, 
U(p) is the average level of an individual's utility when the population is p. 
Total happiness is thus equal to p x U(p) and is equal to the area under 
the curve Hp. The marginal happiness schedule is Mp and when this 
crosses below 0, further increases in population decrease total happiness . 
In the first graph, the marginal happiness schedule falls below 0, while in 
the second graph it does not fall below 0. Thus if a graph such as the first 
reflects the happiness of a society as a function of the population of a 
society, it is not possible to indefinitely add individuals to the population 
without decreasing total happiness. If a graph such as the second 
describes the relationship, then it is possible to indefinitely add people 
without decreasing total happiness . The possibility of societies such as 
those graphed in (a), however, enables us to reject Parfit 's claim that for 
any possible and large population, it must be possible to add more people 
to form a society which would not be worse (since its former members 








could use the egalitarian variant of this society). For in the case of 
societies such as those graphed in (a), it is not possible to continually add 
people without harming those already existing. 
Though Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion does not seem to follow from 
his premises, we can still ask the question of whether a total utilitarian 
position would result in a large population at a very low level of 
happiness. In maximizing total happiness at the point where the 
elasticity equals one, will each individual be at a very low level of utility 
close to Parfit's restricted level? If the happiness maximizing level is 
near this restricted level, then we still might have an intuitive objection 
to total utilitarianism. 
It should be stated that although total utilitarianism may make 
more stringent demands upon existing individuals than average 
utilitarianism, this is not sufficient grounds upon which to reject it . The 
original position is supposed to convince existing individuals who are or 
will be brought into existence not to be partial to their ovm positions by 
depriving them of the knowledge that they will definitely be brought into 
existence. Thus I do not want to claim that the total utilitarian 
conclusion will not make any new demands upon existing individuals: 
rather it will make such new demands but these demands should not be 
rejected merely because existing individuals want to be partial to their 
own situation. 
What if someone agrees with this but objects that total utilitarianism 
is still too demanding in that it requires that individuals must sometimes 
19 
have children when they don't want to? Doesn't this objection seem to 
have some intuitive plausibility? While total utilitarianism will sometimes 
say that individuals should have children when they don't want to, it 
seems doubtful that it would often requir-e couples to have children when 
they have a strong preference not to because new children are generally 
not very happy if brought into the world with no one wanting them. It 
also seems better to admit that 'it would be better for society to be 
organized so that maximum happiness was produced (even if it meant 
that sometimes individuals had to have children when they did not want 
to) and to admit that society was falling short of that standard (which 
was derived and justified by a consistent application of the original 
position) and could do better than to say that the best society is one in 
which individuals are allowed to be partial to those currently existing. 
Why not admit that society could do better by producing more people but 
that it is not doing so? This does not mean that the society is evil or 
wicked as it is but rather only that it could be improved by moving in the 
direction of a total utilitarian position. This seems a better course than 
saying that merely because a moral theory makes demands upon us that 
we don't entirely fulfill. we should scrap the theory. Rather we should 
admit that we could be doing better and try to do so. 
We might still wonder about the point where the elasticity of total 
happiness is 1. Is this a point where individuals' utility levels will be close 
to the restricted level? Even if we admit that total utilitarianism can 
permissably make demands upon us, doesn't it still seem objectionable if 
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individuals end up near the restricted level? Parfit is bothered by this 
when he says: 
On the New Conclusion, Higher Z [a society with lives near the 
restricted level] is only claimed to be not worse than A [a society 
with a fewer number of people but a high average level of 
utility]. But this still seems, to me at least, pretty repugnant. 
Lives that are not much above our Restricted Level cannot be 
well worth living. Even if worth living, they must be devoid of 
most of what gives life personal value - value to the person 
whose life it is . If we cannot avoid this New Conclusion, this 
undermines wq~t most of us believe when we consider 
overpopulation. 
Parfit's lament, however, seems misplaced. It begs the question to 
complain against a total utilitarian theory that the lives that result from 
its being implemented are deprived of personal value. For some of the 
lives resulting from it wouldn't even have been brought into existence if 
the alternative society (having a small population with a high average 
utility) had been opted for. Thus although lives in this new society may 
not have as much value per life as alternative societies, those people who 
are now existing (and wouldn't have otherwise) won't feel their lives are 
deprived of personal value for they wouldn't even have been living under a 
different regime. 
Though Parfit's above complaint against classical utilitarianism 
seems lo beg the question, we can ask whether it is empirically plausible 
to assume that total utilitarianism would have people existing at the 
restricted level. I think Parfit's concern that classical utilitarianism 
would result in masses of individuals living al the subsistence level is 
misguided . Individuals in their own lives don't place such a high premium 
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on continued existence that they sacrifice indefinite amounts of quality 
for increased quantity. Many individuals smoke cigarettes and drink 
alcohol - activities which surely decrease the quantity of life. Other 
individuals eat too much and don't exercise enough or drive too fast in 
their cars. If individuals in their own lives opt to maximize happiness by 
sacrificing some of the quantity for more quality, it seems unreasonable 
to think that a classical utilitarian position would require individuals to 
make these and even more severe sacrifices in the quality of life (so that 
they end up at the restricted level) so that they can increase the quantity 
of life of someone else. (It is of course possible that these decreases in 
quality in a person's life would bring about a greater increase in quantity 
than his own extension of life but the limits to this would still seem to 
place the quality of life above the restricted level.) People aren't willing to 
make sacrifices that would put them near the subsistence level even if 
this would greatly increase the quantity of their own life and so it seems 
mistaken to believe that they would be required to make these same 
sacrifices to increase the quantity of someone else's life. Thus the 
concern that total utilitarianism would have people subsisting at a very 
low level seems mistaken to me14 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper argues that a total utilitarianism position would be 
chosen if the constraints of the original position are consistently adhered 
to. A straightforward generalization of Harsanyi's characterization of the 
original position suffers both from the logical flaw of having the states of 
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nature be dependent upon the actions of individuals as well as the 
morally objectionable feature that individuals presumed to exist will be 
able to be partial to their own situation in an original position framework 
which is designed to insure an impartial choice of principles. A more 
sophisticated extension of Harsanyi's characterization avoids both these 
problems and results in total utilitarianism being chosen in the original 
position. 
The "justice as equal opportunity" position is argued against by 
pointing out that its standard of an equal resource base must make 
reference to the size of the population to have any intuitive appeal and 
the equal opportunity standard is incomplete in that it just treats as 
indifferent all policies which preserve equal opportunity; it doesn't opt for 
a greater population if all the members will have good lives and the 
standard will still be satisfied (and doesn't give any guidance as to 
permissible tradeoffs if the larger population won't completely satisfy the 
standard) . The equal opportunity standard is fundamentally incomplete 
in this resp,ect. Moreover the equal treatment standard inherits the 
implausible features that have plagued Rawls ' difference principle. 
A total utilitarian position does not result in Parfit 's "Repugnant 
Conclusion"; his repugnant conclusion overlooks the fact that we may 
well be in a society where the marginal happiness curve at some point 
equals 0 and that beyond this point further increases in population cause 
total happiness to decrease . There is also no good reason to believe that 
a total utilitarian position would have people existing at the subsistence 
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level. Although a total utilitarianism position will make more demands 
upon existing individuals than average utilitarianism. the theory should 
not be rejected for this reason. The total utilitarian view has the 
intuitively acceptable consequence of not having people existing at the 
subsistence level as well as following from a consistent and rigorous 
formulation of the original position. 
yields an individual in the original position utility 
(&~(A) . ./).. 
W(A) = (1/Q) L; Ui(A) + L; Q- (.SXR)(A)U;(A). 
j=l j=l 
Because I have assumed the utility of not being born is zero, the 
second term in the above summation is zero. If it was not 
assumed to be zero, the second term is not zero. The 
conclusion would not follow, however, that the average 
happiness of existing people should be maximized. Since Q is 
constant, both the total and average happiness of individuals in 
the original position will be maximized by the choice of A which 
maximizes the above summation. However, the conclusion 
(believed by Rawls and indicated by a straightforward 
generalization of Harsanyi's theorem) that the average utility of 
existing individuals would be the most plausible utilitarian 
position chosen in the original position does not follow. Thus 
our assumption that the utility of unborn individuals is zero is 
not necessary for our conclusion that the principles chosen in 
the original position would be ones which maximize the total 
and average utility of individuals in the original position and not 
the average and total uWity of existing people . "Wbat is crucial 
for this conclusion is that the people who do (and will) exist in 
the world not be automatically indentified with the people in the 
original position; the two arguments against the identification 
have been given in the text. 
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7. c.f. A 7heory of Justice, p . 162. 
8. Note that this solution to the future generations problem allows 
discounting of their future benefits only to the extent that there 
is exogenous uncertainty about their receiving these benefits. 
The proposal in this section assumes that individuals can 
make meaningful interpersonal comparisons of utility. For a 
discussion of how these are possible , see Harsanyi, op. cit ., and 
Stephen Selinger's A hfeTISe of a Preference Ib.sed , lung Run 
Utilitarin.nism, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton 
University, 1981. 
9. This proposal has been put forward by Talbot Page, "Intergenerational 
Justice as Opportunity," and Brian Barry, "Justice Between 
Generations." 
10. c.f . "Future Generations: Further Problems," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 1982. 
11. See ibid ., pp . 162-163. Parfit's reply to the charge that this added 
group ends up harming the previously existing groups seems 
rather unconvincing to me. It does not enable him to consider 
where we have to actively consider a population policy rather 
than passively judge how we would have liked a history of the 
world to have developed. 
12. Ibid., p . 168. 
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13. lbid. , p . 168. 
14. The objection is also sometimes made that utilitarianism would have 
present generations existing at a very low level of satisfaction 
because by these generations saving more, later generations will 
be able to be much better off due to this saving being 
productively invested over a number of years. 
Two points should be kept in mind, however. First, the 
tendency to have earlier generations starve so that later 
generations will be better off is mitigated to a large extent by 
considerations of diminishing marginal utility; because these 
earlier generations will have less goods, they will derive more 
utility from these goods than later generations. Second, to the 
extent that considerations of the additional productivity from 
earlier generations saving outweigh considerations of 
diminishing marginal utility, the utilitarian has the same 
convincing reply he has in the intragenerational case . The 
utilitarian Y~ill recommend that if a very sick rich person will 
benefit more from a drug than an only mildly ill poor person , 
the drug should be given to the rich person as it will do more 
good there. Similarly, if later generations, who will already be 
better, will benefit more from the goods saved by earlier 
generations than the earlier generations would by spending 
them, the goods should be so saved. 
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ASSET RETURNS OF REAL ESTATE IN DIFFERENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC AREAS AND INFLATION 
1. Introduction 
There have been a number of studies, both theoretical and empirical. 
on the effects of inflation on assets. Several of these studies have looked 
at real estate in particular and most of them have treated real estate as 
a homogenous commodity. However, it is reasonable to ask whether real 
estate should be so treated. The commodity of real estate is a 
differentiated one that can take on many different characteristics, the 
most prominent of which is the property's location. Thus. a research 
strategy that studies real estate in different socio-economic areas and 
does not combine them together will better reflect the diffentiated nature 
of the product. There are three reasons for separating real estate into 
different socio-economic locations when studying the effect of inflation on 
real estate values . One reason is that the location of a piece of real 
estate is undoubtedly correlated v.ith the marginal tax bracket of 
homeowners in an area. A house in a relatively poor socio-economic area 
will be surrounded by other houses who have owners who are relatively 
poor. Inflation increases the marginal tax brackets of individuals and 
since home mortgage payments are deductible , real estate values in 
different areas may be affected differently by inflation. The relative after-
tax cost of housing may change in different areas as a result of inflation 
and this may affect the price of housing in the different areas . A second 
reason for studying real estate in different socio-economic areas is that 
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one of the characteristics affecting the value of a home is the bundle of 
local public services, e.g., local schools, police protection, road repairs, 
etc. that are provided with the house. The relative amounts of public 
services provided to each area could possibly vary with the intlation rate . 
This would result in intlation impacting differently upon the different 
areas since one of the determinants of housing values is the amount of 
local services provided with the house. In effect, by combining areas with 
different local services, we could possibly be introducing a 
misspecification into our model. weal services are a determinant of 
housing prices and by neglecting these services we would be omitting a 
relevant variable. A third reason for studying real estate in different 
areas is that there is no reason a priori to combine real estate in 
different locations without testing to see if this pooling is permissible . We 
should no more combine the assets of real estate in different areas than 
we should combine the assets of gold and common stocks. It may in fact 
be permissible to treat the different socio-economic areas as one area in 
certain cases but the permissability of this pooling should be tested . 
The goals of this paper are to test for the effects of intlation on rates 
of return on residential owner occupied in different socio-economic areas . 
Measures of expected and unexpected intlation will be defined and 
discussed. Rates of return from owning real estate in different areas will 
then be computed . These rates of return will then be regressed upon the 
measures of expected and unexpected and inflation. A test will then be 
performed to determine whether it is possible to pool the rates of return 
in the different areas. We will also be able to examine whether expected 
or unexpected inflation had a larger.impact upon returns in the different 
areas. 
ll. Literature Review 
There has been a significant amount of study concerning the return 
of common stocks and treasury bills when there are changes in the rates 
of expected and unexpected inflation. Lintner ( 1975) was one of the first 
to observe the negative relationship between expected inflation rates and 
the return to common stocks . Later this relationship was confirmed by 
Jaffe and Mandel.ker (1976), Body (1976), Nelson (1976), Fama and 
Schwert (1977), and Cohn and Lessard (1981). In order to study the 
effects of inflation upon real estate returns, it is necessary to develop a 
measure of housing prices so that rates of return can be calculated. We 
thus need to review some of the literature regarding the determinants of 
housing prices 
There have been several studies concerning the determinants of 
housing values. These studies have been primarily cross sectional within 
the same time period. Thus Bailey ( 1966) examined the influence of a 
neighborhood's racial composition and population density on housing 
prices. Grether and Mieszkowski (1974) analyze both the particular 
characteristics of a house that determine its value, e .g., the square feet of 
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the house, age of the house, number of bathrooms, quality of carpet, etc. 
as well as the local characteristics that determine its quality, e.g., the 
pupil/teacher ratio in the schools, traffic flow, racial composition, etc. 
More recently, Noland (1979) has studied the different determinants of 
owner occupied and rental housing value. Grether and Mieszkowski used 
both linear and semi-log models and found that the estimated coefficients 
of both models were rather similar. Grether and Mieszkowski dealt 
somewhat with the time series nature of their data in that they computed 
rates of return on land values; the primary focus of both of these papers, 
however, was on the determinants of real estate value from a stationary 
viewpoint (although to be able to assemble the data base, it was 
necessary to pool houses over a certain length of time.) The articles did 
not primarily deal with any of the determinants of residential housing 
value over time, which is what we shall do when we study the impact of 
inflation on different socio-economic areas over the last fifteen years . 
There have been several studies - both theoretical and empirical -
of the effect of inflation upon the demand for housing. On the theoretical 
side, Titman (1983) modeled the behavior of high and low income 
individuals in response to an increase in anticipated inflation. He found 
that with a fixed supply of housing, higher income individuals will 
increase their consumption of housing while lower income individuals 
decrease their consumption of housing. 
Titman's results. however, are not really applicable to the situation 
we are studying . He assumes that there is just one, homogenous 
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commodity called housing and that its price increases are the same in all 
areas. Thus, it does not tell us whether to expect that the price will go up 
more or less in "good" areas with high income individuals or "bad" areas 
with low income individuals. 
On the empirical side, Kearl ( 1979) found that an increase in the rate 
of anticipated inflation reduces housing demand and housing prices . 
Using data from the Federal Reserve Board, Kearl regressed the price of 
housing upon a constant, the initial quarterly mortgage payment, the 
cost of capital, the stock of housing, and the income level of households. 
He found that through its effect on initial mortgage payments, an 
increase in inflation reduced housing demand and housing prices . Kearl 
did not investigate the change in housing prices of different socio-
economic areas due to an increase in inflation and so his results are not 
directly relevant to our study. 
On the other hand, Rosen (1979) argued that the value of residential 
real estate should rise in an inflationary environment because the income 
tax system is not indexed. Because nominal rather than real interest 
payments are tax deductible, he argued an increase in inflation decreases 
the after tax cost of capital for homeowners, which in turn increases the 
demand for housing and increases its real price. Rosen and Rosen (1980) 
studied a time series of housing prices from Histarical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to 1970. They regressed the proportion of 
households O'YI'Iling houses upon permanent income, credit availability, 
and certain demographic characteristics of families . They found that not 
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using the after tax cost of capital leads to underestimates of the 
percentage of homeowners . 
Follain ( 1979) was one of the few to investigate the effect of inflation 
upon the housing demand of di.1Ierent income groups. He did this only 
using a cross sectional analysis consisting of part of the 1975 Annual 
Housing Survey. Follain used a maximum likelihood approach to 
estimate the demand function of housing. He found that an increase in 
the rate of anticipated inflation increases the demand for housing among 
individuals in the 40% or higher tax bracket and reduces the demand for 
individuals in lower tax brackets. However, he also did not study the 
behavior of housing prices in high and low income areas over time in an 
inflationary period. Rather he just studied the behavior on the demand 
side of the market in a single period of one cross section. There are thus 
two reasons why Follain's results are not directly relevant to ours. The 
first is that he considered only one time period and did not analyze a 
time series . The second is that he only studied the demand side of the 
market in different socio-economic areas and did not study the behavior 
of housing prices in different areas . It could be the case that the demand 
for housing was decreased relative to other areas but that prices in this 
area rose the same or more than other areas depending upon the impact 
of inflation upon the supply curves in the different areas. Thus the 
second main difference between our study and Follain's study is that he 
studied only the demand side of the market while we are studying prices-
which are the result of both the supply and demand sides. 
Particularly in view of the fact that the value of the assets in real 
estate exceeds the value of the assets contained in common stocks, 
relatively little study has been made of the effect of expected and 
unexpected inflation on real estate prices. In their 1979 study, Fama and 
Schwert found that private residential real estate was a complete hedge 
against expected inflation and a partial hedge against unanticipated 
inflation . The Fama-Schwert test for the return of an asset as a hedge 
against expected inflation is to regress the percentage change in the price 
of the asset against the expected and unexpected rates of inflation. This 
study will follow the test of the Fama-Schwert model so it is worthwhile 
discussing their model more fully. 
Fama-Schwert define the return on the i-th asset in period t to be 
the percentage change in the price of the i-th asset in period t. 
p,. • - P..· . -1 D. - \,• 1,• 
.. .,. t -
· Pu -1 
(1) 
In a previous study, Fama (1975) argued that the rates on United 
State Treasury bills were a good measure of the rate of expected inflation. 
Fama found that if we assume that real rates of return on treasury bills 
are constant through time , then the changes in the nominal rates of 
return reflect changes in the expected rate of inflation. Fama argued 
that if the expected real return on a treasury bill is constant through 
time, and if the bill market is efficient, the nominal return is equal to the 
constant expected real return plus the expected inflation rate. U!t Bt be 
the nominal return on a treasury bill which matures at time t. Because 
this bill is sold at time t-1. the nominal return is known at time t-1. Let 
E(ft I Kt -1) be the expected rate of inflation at time t conditioned on our 
knowledge at time t-1 . Let E(i) be the constant expected real return. If 
the nominal return is equal to the constant expected real return plus the 
expected inft.ation rate, we have 
- -Bt = E(i) + E(I, I Kt-1) (2) 
Subtracting and rearranging we have 
- -
E(lt I.Kt-1) = l1t - E(i). (3) 
If E( i) is constant then we can substitute a for it and (3) can then be 
tested from estimates of (4). 
- -
It = a + bBt + et (4) 
-
where the proposition of (4) is that b=l.O and E(e,! Ksubt -1) = 0; that is, 
if we suppose that the expected real rate of return is constant, all 
variation in the nominal rate of returnBt at t-1 reflects variation in the 
expected value of the inflation rate to be observed at t (or 
- -
E(Jt 1Rt -1)E(Jt IKt-1.) The unexpected value of the inflation rate is then 
-the disturbance term et. 
In their 1975 study, Fama-Schwert found that the regression of the 
annual inflation rate on the interest rate of a treasury bill which matures 
at the end of the one year period indicates that the nominal rate on a 
treasury bill is a good proxy for the annual expected inflation rate. The 
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estimate of b is 1.06 with a standard error of 0.10,J?2 is 0.82, and the 
residuals do not seem autocorrelated. 
Fama's 1975 study is relevant for present purposes because we need 
some measure of the rate of expected inflation if we are to determine the 
ability of an asset to serve as a hedge against expected inflation. His 
study justifies taking the nominal rates on treasury bills as such a 
measure. 
One key assumption of Fama-Schwert's 1975 study is that the 
expected real returns of treasury bills remain constant. That is, the 
expected return of real interest rates is expected to remain constant and 
any variation in nominal rates is to be explained by changes in the 
expected rate of future inflation. (Note that this assumption of a 
constant expected rate of interest is consistent with our methodology in 
chapter two where it was assumed that the ex post real rate of interest 
could vary. The real rate of interest was there defined to be the 
difference between the current interest rate and the rate of inflation 
realized over the past year. This rate can vary depending upon how much 
(or whether) the nominal rate of interest exceeds the realized rate. This 
is cons istent with holding that the future rate of expected real returns is 
constant however.) 
We might wonder, however, if this assumption of constant expected 
real rates is valid. For instance, in September 1983, rates on three 
month treasury bills have been approximately 9% (give or take .5%). The 
inflation rate in the preceding year has been about 2.4 % on an 
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annualized basis. lf we consider real rates of interest to generally be 
about 2-3% above the inflation rate, then we would have to say that 
investors expect that the inflation rate is to jump to about 6 to 7 over 
the next three months. lf the real rate is constant (at 2-3%) only an 
expectation that inflation will jump back to 6-7% over the three month 
period from Sept. to Dec . would explain the nominal rate of 9%. Given 
that the inflation rate has been 2.4% on an annualized basis, it may seem 
unlikely that investors really expect inflation to increase to 6-7% over the 
next three months. One might rather hypothesize that real expected 
rates of return have been higher at some times than at others . 
The problem with the hypothesis that real rates of return have 
varied is that it is difficult to explain what would account for the changes 
in these real rates. The ability of the United States Government to 
redeem the notes at maturity does not seem to change and so it is 
dificult to see how a higher risk premium at certain times might account 
for the different real rates . In the absence of an explanation why real 
rates of return should be higher, it seems plausible to assume that 
investors may not have been convinced that inflation ¥.ill stay down (if 
rates seem abnormally high.) This assumption of a constant expected 
real rate of return is crucial for the measure of expected inflation we 
employ (following Farna-Schwert) and it is not entirely unproblematic; 
however as yet there does not seem to be a good theory which relates the 
real rates on treasury bills to both the supply and demand for credit in 
the market. Thus lacking any good explanation of the factors causing 
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variation in real rates, we will note the possible shortcomings of Fama's 
method but continue to use it measure expected inflation. The falsity of 
his assumption of constant expected real rates would cause a 
misspecification in our model however. 
We will thus take the expected rate of inflation during period t to be 
equal to the nominal interest rate on a treasury bill which sells at the 
beginning of the t-th period and matures at the end of the t-th period. 
The unanticipated rate of infiation is then defined to be the difference 
between the infiation realized ex post and the expected rate of inflation 
(as measured by the nominal interest rate). If we let Bt be the expected 
rate of infiation, and Dt be the infiation rate realized ex post. the 
unanticipated rate is D: - Bt . 
In order to estimate the effectiveness of an asset as a hedge against 
infiation we must see how the return of this asset varies with the 
expected and unexpected rates of inflation. Thus we will run a regression 
of the asset return upon the expected and unexpected rates of inflation. 
(5) 
In the above equation Ri stands for the return on real estate in the j-th 
area and j equals 1, 2, 3. because there are three socio-economic areas; t 
is the time period and equals 1, 2 . ... 27 because we are looking at semi-
annual returns over an approximately fourteen year period. The 
coefficients bi and ci measure ability of real estate in the j-th area to 
serve as a hedge against expected and unexpected inflation . 
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The Fama-Schwert paper is an interesting and useful one and we will 
follow its general framework in this study. However with respect to their 
treatment of the returns from residential real estate, there are two main 
drawbacks . First, the sample of houses in the Fama-Schwert study 
consists only of houses that were sold through loans made by the Federal 
Housing Administration (rnA) . In order for a house to qualify for an FHA 
mortgage, it must be a relatively low priced house. For instance, as of 
January 1983, a house had to be priced under $108,000.00 in order to 
qualify for an FHA loan . This causes the houses in the sample of Fama-
Schwert to be all of the lower price variety. We might wonder if the 
return on middle and upper income residential real estate was a similar 
hedge against inflation. 
The second major difficulty with the Fama-Schwert study (which they 
note) is that the prices they use to construct the rate of return are the 
prices of the average square foot of housing; the average transaction 
price of the houses that sold with an FHA mortgage is divided by the 
amount of square feet in the average house to obtain a price per square 
foot of housing. 'What is desired, however, are prices that allow us to 
calcul a te a rate of return net of both interim costs and benefits 
associated with holding real estate. The relevant costs are mortgage 
expenses, property taxes , and imputed maintenance and management 
fees . The benefits are the imputed rental value of the house and the tax 
benefits of the deductibility of interest on mortgage payments.2 These 
benefits are not given in the data used to construct the rnA Horne 
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Purchase Price Index. Because the Fama-Schwert article uses gross 
transaction prices (as reflected in the square foot prices) to construct 
the rate of return, it will not yield an accurate measure of the real 
economic rate of return. 
This study attempts to rectify these two problems in the Fama-
Schwert study. The first problem is addressed by looking at the impact of 
inflation upon real estate returns in both middle income and upper 
income areas as well as lower income areas. The second problem is 
rectified because the prices used to compute the rates of return reflect 
all of the relevant economic costs and benefits that go into buying and 
owning a house and not only the costs and benefits captured by the 
transaction prices of the buying and selling of the house. The transaction 
prices are adjusted in the next section to reflect all of the interim costs 
and benefits associated with owning a house . However, for the purposes 
of comparison, we shall also calculate a rate of return based upon the 
method of prices which Fama-Schwert used. Their measure of the price 
of housing was the average price per square foot of a house. We "Will also 
calculate rates of return based upon these prices and compare them to 
rates of return based upon all of the relevant interim costs and benefits. 
II. The Data 
The data in this study come from the Pasadena Board of Realtors 
Multiple Listing Books . The data were compiled semi-annually- from the 
first half of 1968 to the second half of 1982 - in volumes that list which 
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houses sold. There are six pieces of information collected on each 
transaction. These are the price for which the house sold, the number or 
square feet in the house, the number of square feet on the lot on which 
the house rested, a rental price at which the house would have rented, 
the date the house sold, the interest rate on the mortgage of the house 
when it was bought, and a dummy variable for the area in which the 
house was located. 
The rental price was constructed for each house by regressing the 
rental price of houses that rented in each period in a given area upon a 
constant and the square feet of the houses . Rental prices for the houses 
that sold were then estimated by multiplying the number of square feet 
in their house times the rental coefficient of house square feet in that 
period and adding the constant of that quarter . 
There are three different areas that are being studied. The first is 
the area consisting of the northwest area of Pasadena. This area is a 
lower income area with a high percentage of minorities (primarily black 
and latin) . The second area consists of part of southeast Pasadena. This 
is a largely middle income area with a predominantly Caucasian 
population. The third area is the community of San Marino . This area is 
upper income and almost exclusively Caucasian. Table I gives the income 
of homeowners and ethnic compositions of the areas on the basis of data 
given in the 1960, 1970, and 1980 censuses . 
TABLE I 
% of Minorities San Marino Northwest Pasadena Southeast Pasadena 
1960 00.6 47.1 00.5 
1970 00.7 69.1 2.0 
1980 8.2 76.2 13.7 
Income San Marino Northwest Pasadena Southeast Pasadena 
1960 17,055 5,210 7,890 
1970 24,096 9,431 16,710 
1980 51,011 15,741 29,034 
There were some items that were not recorded for every transaction. 
For instance, sometimes the square feet of the houses that sold were not 
listed and an educated guess had to be made about the size of the house. 
This procedure seemed preferable to reducing the size of the sample. 
There is no reason to think that there was any systematic bias in the 
guesses. Thus the estimates of the coefficients that result from 
combining transactions With partial data with those with complete data 
should be unbiased. 3 
One possible bias in the model exists because the houses which were 
selected in the Pasadena areas were always selected from the lowest 
prices which sold while those which were selected from the San Marino 
area were selected from the highest price houses which sold. The reason 
for doing this is to make the neighborhood effect in each of the areas 
more uniform. The higher priced houses in the southeast Pasadena area 
are in a significantly nicer area than the lower priced houses. The higher 
priced houses are the estate type houses found in the sample of houses 
selected from San Marino. Moreover the homeowners living in these 
houses could reasonably be assumed to have significantly higher incomes 
than those individuals in the lower priced houses . Thus in order to keep 
the neighborhood effect and the marginal tax bracket as uniform as 
possible, houses were selected from the lower priced houses which sold in 
both Pasadena areas and from the higher priced area in San Marino. 
The data used to estimate the income and tax bracket of the 
homeowners in the areas came from the Census Bureau data of 1960, 
1970, and 1980. The overall growth in income that occurred in each 
decade was assumed to have taken place according to the rate of 
inflation. Thus, for example, if the growth in income over the decade in 
an area was 50%, and inflation was 10% in the first year, it was assumed 
that wages rose 5% in the first year. The income tax bracket of 
individuals in each area was estimated to be the same. It would be 
desirable to have information about the tax rate of each individual, but 
such information could not be located. The Annual Housing Survey 
contains information about the tax brackets of individual homeowners, 
but does not contain such information over a fifteen year time period in 
any particular cross sections. The Multiple Listing Books contain 
information over a fifteen year period, but do not have the individual's 
tax rates . The City of Pasadena also did not have any data of income 
growth beside that or the census . 
The transaction price for which a house sold was modified according 
to the follov-ring formula that adjusts the house according to the positive 
or negative cash flow the house produces. 
F1J = Pu + NM [(1- Tu)( .85P-u!1000x pptu {6) 
+ {.02/12)Pu)- .94rentaLu] 
Particularly to those unfamiliar with the business of buying, renting, 
and then selling houses, the above expression (6) may appear rather 
mysterious and ad hoc. In fact, however, it is the natural way to adjust 
the nominal selling price of a house to reflect the monetary effect of 
carrying the house for a year. We will be studying carrying costs over a 
one year period because we are interested in the rate of return over a one 
year period and so must calculate the carrying costs over this length of 
time. If we take the actual price someone paid for a house to be his real 
economic cost of holding the house for a year, we would be making a 
mistake. For this cost of buying the home can be greater or smaller than 
the relevant economic cost depending upon whether or not the house 
yielded a positive or negative cash !low over the time period in question. 
The situation is analogous to determining the relevant price of a security 
on the stock market. If one stock yielded higher dividends than another 
stock even though both sold for the same prices over a one year period, 
they would not have the same relevant economic prices . The one with the 
higher dividend stream would have had a lower economic price at the 
beginning of the period because its net cost was lower than the other one 
(or alternatively one could say it had a higher economic price at the end 
of the period) . Similarly, if two houses sold for the same prices over a 
one year period but one house had a higher positive cash !low than the 
other one, we would want to say that the house with the higher cash !low 
had a lower economic cost than the other house . This is the motivation 
for adjusting the data according to (6). The formula for adjusting the 
data according to (6) is similar to the formula used in chapter two except 
that the tax effects are now included in the formula. 
Let us go through expression (6) term by term. Pit is the price the i-
th house sold for in period t; NM stands for the number of months the 
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house was owned and will be equal to 12 because we will study the returns 
from holding patterns of one year; Tu is the marginal tax bracket of the 
owner of the i-th house in the t -th period and since the interest on house 
payments is tax deductible, 1 - Tu is the after tax percentage of 
mortgage payments the homeowner pays; pptu is the price per thousand 
dollars that an owner would have to pay on a loan amortized over thirty 
years -- it is multiplied by .85 of the price because it assumed that on 
average individuals make a down payment of 15%; (.02/12)Pu is the 
monthly portion of the yearly property tax if the property tax is figured 
at a rate of 2% of the sales price;4 renta4.t is the rental value of the i-th 
house in period t. 
The rental value is multiplied by only .94 to allow for the implicit 
maintenance and managerial services which a homeowner must face . The 
rental value is not multiplied times the marginal tax bracket of the 
average homeowner in the area, because the homeowner does not have to 
pay any taxes on the implicit income he receives from living in the house . 
It is sometimes said that the deductibility of home interest payments 
provides the taxpayer 1\'ith a subsidy. This is really not the case , however . 
For a landlord who rents property to tenants also is able to deduct 
interest payments. Rather the real tax benefit to homeowners resides in 
the fact that the homeowner does not have to declare as taxable income 
the benefit he receives from staying in the house . This is why the rental 
value of the house is not multiplied by the homeowners marginal tax 
bracket. 
Perhaps a word of explanation is in order about the inclusion of the 
rental value of the house in the adjustment of the house. Even though 
most of these houses were owner occupied, the owner was receiving a 
benefit in kind from staying in the house which must be figured into the 
adjusted price; thus it is necessary to enter in the rental value of the 
house in constructing prices even for owner occupied housing. 
The adjusted prices obtained from (6) are then regressed upon the 
characteristics of the houses to obtain values for the regression 
coefficients of house square feet and lot square feet. 
A!ter the transaction prices have been modified to incorporate the 
positive or negative cash flow from holding them for a twelve month 
period, the houses in each area and each quarter were pooled and the 
regression in (7) was run. 
(7) 
and where HFi.t and LFi.t stand for (respectively) the square feet of the i-th 
house and lot in the j-th section in the t-th period. 
We Vvill also experiment with a functional form in which we regress 
the price of a house upon a constant , the log of square feet of the house 
and the log of the square feet of the lot as in (8). The reason for 
experimenting with these different functional forms is because the price 
of a house might be a linear function of the square feet of the house and 
lot on which it rests; or on the other hand, the price of a house might not 
increase as fast Vvith each additional square foot of house size and lot size 
that is added. For instance, the price of a house might increase more if 
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its size is increased from 1000 square feet to 1500 square feet than if its 
size is increased from 5000 square feet to 5500 square feet. If the 
derivative of price with respect to size is not constant but rather is 
positive but decreasing , we would want to use a functional form such as 
(B).5 
(B) 
The regression coefficients a 1it and a 2it that are obtained from (7) 
(or (B)) are then multiplied by the mean value of the square feet of the 
bouse in each area over the fifteen year period and summed together 
with the constant to obtain the price of buying a house and holding it for 
a specified period of time. They are multiplied by the same mean because 
it would not be sensible to just average the prices of the houses in each 
period because in some periods there might be large lots or large houses 
which, if the transaction prices were just averaged, would appear to make 
the price of housing increase more than it actually did. The regression 
coefficients are multiplied by a constant number in every period to avoid 
this problem. The buying prices are thus computed as in (9). 
P}t = a it + a lit HFj + a 2;t LFi (9) 
The buying prices as constructed represent not just the cost of buying an 
average size house situated on an average size lot in a given area at a 
given time but also include the costs of carrying the house for a one year 
period. These are the relevant prices we want when constructing rates of 
return. 
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The selling prices for each area are computed in a similar way except 
that the cash ftow of the house is not figured into the adjusted price. 
When one buys a house and holds it for a period of time, the positive or 
negative cash ftow must be figured into the price but when one sells a 
house, all one gets are the proceeds from the transaction price. Thus in 
determining selling prices, the unadjusted transaction prices were 
regressed upon the house characteristics to determine regression 
coefficients of house square feet and lot square feet (and also the 
coefficients of the logs of house feet and lot feet as in (11)) . 
(10) 
(11) 
These regression coefficients are then multiplied times their 
respective mean values as in (9) to arrive at the selling price of housing in 
each period as in ( 12 ) . 
Pft = a;t + ~t;tHFj + ~2;tLF; (12) 
Ill . The Hypothesis to TesL 
The hypothesis we "¥~ish to test is that the different socio-economic 
areas have served equally well as hedges against inflation. To test this 
hypothesis, we must calculate the rate of return from owning real estate 
in the different areas and regress this rate of return upon the inflation 
rate. 
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The rate of return to real estate in the different areas is defined as 
the percentage change in the price of real estate in going from one period 
to another . We will thus define~~ as the return on real estate in the i-th 
area of the t-th period and it is equal to the percentage change in the 
price of real estate in the i-th area in going from the t-1 to t period. 
p$, -~t-1 
R - '· , . j,t - pB 
j .t-1 
(13) 
The buying price is subtracted from the selling price because the buying 
price has been defined to include not only the costs involved in the 
transaction price but also all of the interim costs and benefits associated 
with holding the house. 
The returns from real estate will then be regressed upon both the 
expected and unexpected rate of inflation. As we said in our 
introduction, we will follow Fama in taking the expected rate of inflation 
during period t to be equal to the interest rate on a treasury bill which 
sells at the beginning of the t-th period and matures at the end of the t-
th period . The unanticipated rate of inflation is then defined to be 
interest rate realized ex post and expected (ex ante) interest rate . If we 
let Bt be the expected rate of inflation, and D, be the inflation realized ex 
post, the unanticipated inflation rate is D, - Bt. 
There have been some exogenous shocks that may have changed the 
value of residential properties in different areas of Pasadena. ln 
particular, the two exogenous shocks we will examine (and control for if 
significant) are the construction of a new freeway built in a portion of the 
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northwest area of Pasadena and a court ordered school busing that 
changed the previous pattern of local neighborhood schools in 1970. We 
will test for the statistical significance of price changes due to these 
exogenous shocks by using a dummy variable to test if the rates of return 
are abnormally higher or lower in the years the freeway was built or 
busing was implemented. When the rates of return are regressed upon 
the expected and unexpected rates of inflation as in (11), there will also 
be a dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1970 or later (the first 
year of court ordered busing) and the cross sections are either of the 
Pasadena areas and zero otherwise; and one if the year is 1972 (the year 
the freeway was begun) and the area is northwest Pasadena. 
The reason for studying the effect of the highway and busing upon 
the prices of the different areas is to determine if factors other than 
inflation may have impacted upon the areas differently and be 
responsible for some areas appreciating more than others. If these other 
omitted factors were correlated with the infiation rate, a finding that one 
area was a better hedge against inflation might be in reality due to the 
omitted variable (that was correlated with the inflation rate) and 
impacted differently upon the different areas. 
The reason I chose the years busing was actually implemented and 
the freeway was actually begun and finished for the dummy variables is 
because it would have been very difficult and somewhat arbitrary to pick 
another year, for instance, the year in which information about the 
freeway and busing first became available to the market. The freeway 
had been studied for a long time and the possibility of busing had existed 
for many years before it was actually ordered. 
It is possible to object that the market may have absorbed the 
information about busing and the freeway before they actually took place 
and so using the year in which they were actually implemented to 
measure their impact may be a mistake in that the information may have 
already been incorporated by the market. However, since it is practically 
impossible to say when the market first started incorporating rumors 
about the possibility of busing and the freeway, it seemed best to use the 
year in which they were actually implemented (or started to be 
implemented in the case of the freeway being built) . Even if this 
information had already been taken into account by the market, there 
was always the chance that the freeway construction or busing order 
might have been stopped at the last minute. Thus, by testing for the 
significance of the dummy variable in the year of implementation, we are 
able to assume that the market received the new information that there 
was no chance that the freeway construction or busing order would not 
be implemented. 
To summarize, in addition to regressing the rates of return upon the 
expected and unexpected inflation rates , we will also regress them upon 
the two dummy variables previously discussed. These are (respectively) 1 
if the return occurred in 1970 in either of the Pasadena areas (the year 
of school busing) and 0 othervvise; and 1 if the return is in 1972 and the 
area is northwest Pasadena (the year the freeway was built) and 0 
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otherwise. 
Both of these dummy variables turned out to be insignificant. Thus 
we will not use them as explanatory variables in the prices we use to 
construct rates of return. 
The regression to estimate the effect of anticipated and 
unanticipated inflation (and the other variables we are controlling for) on 
the rate of return from real estate is thus 
j = 1, 2, ... 27 
In the above equation j stands for the j-th area and equals 1, 2, 3, 
because there are three socio-economic areas; t is the time period and 
equals 1, 2, ... 25 because we are looking at semi-annual returns over an 
approximately thirteen year period. 
The ability of the different investments to serve as a hedge against 
inflation is then measured by the coefficient bi: the ability of an asset to 
serve as a hedge against unanticipated inflation is measured by the 
coefficient Cj . 
In order to test the hypothesis that the different socio-economic 
areas are affected to the same extent by inflation, we need to also run the 
regression that pools the different areas. The following is this regression. 
(15) 
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A test of whether inflation afiects the real estate values in different 
socio-economic areas equally is then to compare the value of the 
unrestricted residual sum of squares obtained from (14) with the value of 
the restricted sum of squares obtained from (15) . A high F value of this 
ratio will allow us to reject the hypothesis that inflation affects different 
socio-economic areas to the same extent. The F ratio is 
(16) 
where S2 stands for the restricted residual sum of squares obtained from 
(15), S 1 stands for the unrestricted residual sum of squares obtained 
from (14) , r stands for the number of restrictions and equals 6, n is the 
number of observations and equals 75, and k is the number of 
explanatory variables in the unrestricted model and equals 9 (a constant, 
expected, and unexpected inflation for each of the three areas .) The 
hypothesis we are testing is thus: 
Ho=al = a2 =as 
bl=b2=ba 
c 1 = c2 =ca. 
That is, we are testing whether the constant terms and coefficients of 
expected and unexpected inflation were the same in the three areas. 
N . RESULTS AND CONCLUSlON 
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The principal results of this study are contained in Table 1 through 
12. Tables 1 - 3 show the dependent variable of the return from housing 
when one year holding costs are incorporated into the price of a house: a 
price per square foot is then used to calculate the rate of return from 
housing. The price per square foot is the measure of housing prices that 
Fama-Schwert used except that they did not take into account the costs 
and benefits of carrying the house. Tables 1 - 3 show that the coefficients 
of expected and unexpected inflation for San Marino, northwest 
Pasadena, and southeast Pasadena are (respectively) 2.20, 1.54; 2.68, 
3.58; .88,and 3.40. The coefficient on unexpected inflation was significant 
at the 95% level in both Pasadena areas but not significant in San Marino. 
The coefficient of expected inflation was not significant in any of the 
areas. 
The pooled regression shown in Table 4 results in coefficients for 
expected and unexpected inflation of 1.92 and 2.84. The coefficient of 
expected inflation is not significant at the 95% level (though it is at the 
90% level.) The coefficient of unexpected inflation is significant at the 95% 
level. The critical value at the 95% level for rejecting the hypothesis that 
the coefficients of expected and unexpected and inflation are equal in the 
different areas is 2.50 and the value of the Chow test in equation (13) is 
.82. Thus we can accept the hypothesis that the constant terms and the 
coefficients of expected and unexpected inflation are the same in the 
different areas if we use rates of return based upon a price per square 
foot of housing. 
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Tables 5 - B show the results when rates of return are based upon 
prices which are constructed upon semi-annual coefficients of lot feet 
and house feet as in Equation (6). The coefficients for San Marino, 
northwest Pasadena, and southeast Pasadena are respectively -.15, 1.65; 
-.19, 2 .84; 4.51, and 1.66. The coefficient of unexpected inflation was not 
significant in either Pasadena area but was significant in San Marino. The 
coefficient of expected inflation was not significant in the San Marino area 
or northwest Pasadena area but was significant at the 95% level in 
southeast Pasadena. 
The results of running the pooled regression are given in Table B. 
The coefficients of expected and unexpected inflation were 1.45 and 2.05. 
Only the coefficient of unexpected inflation was significant ( although the 
coefficient of expected inflation was significant at the 90% level.) The 
value of the Chow test given in (13) is equal to 1.55. The critical value for 
rejecting the hypothesis that the coefficients of expected and unexpected 
inflation are equal in the different areas is 2.50 at the 95% level so we can 
accept the hypothesis that they are equal. 
Tables 9 - 12 show the results of using prices which are based upon 
coefficients derived from regressing prices upon the log of house feet and 
log feet and then multiplying times the log of house feet and lot feet (as 
in Equation (11)) . The coefficients of San Marino, northwest Pasadena, 
and southeast Pasadena for expected and unexpected inflation are 
(respectively) None of the coefficients of expected inflation were 
significant at the 95% level but the coefficients of unexpected inflation 
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were significant for northwest Pasadena and San Marino. 
The results of the pooled regression are given in Table 12. The 
coefficients of expected and unexpected in!lation were 2.08 and 2.60. The 
coefficient of expected inflation was not significant but the coefficient of 
unexpected intlation was significant. The value of the Chow test given in 
(13) was 1.46 . The critical value for rejection at the 95% level was 2.50 so 
we can accept the hypothesis that the coefficients of expected and 
unexpected inflation were the same in the different areas . 
The conclusion that the coefficients of expected and unexpected 
intlation were the same in different areas thus seems to be robust with 
respect to the measure of real estate prices with which we use to 
construct rates of return . Given that some of coefficients of expected and 
unexpected intlation were not significant, we might wonder, however, if 
the coefficients of expected and unexpected inflation are both zero and 
that they don't influence the rate of return on real estate at all. I have 
tested this hypothesis for each of the pooled models contained in tables 
4, 8, and 12. The critical value for accepting the hypothesis that expected 
and unexpected intlation intluence the rate of return is 2 .37 . The values 
in table s 4 and 8 are (respectively) 4 .42 and 2 .61. However the pooled 
model of table 12 fails to meet the critical value and only achieves a value 
of 2.34. The differences between the constant terms and coefficients in 
the different areas were statistically insignificant regardless of whether 
we used prices based on a price per square foot of housing or prices 
based upon coefficients multiplied by the mean house feet and lot feet. 
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Moreover the hypothesis that none of the explanatory variables influence 
the dependent variable was tested and rejected. However the regressions 
of rates of return prices based upon coefficients obtained from the logs of 
house feet and lot feet turned out not to be influenced by the rates of 
expected and unexpected inflation. 
One significant way in which my results ditier from those of the 
Farna-Schwert study is that the coefficient of unexpected inflation is 
generally larger than that of the coefficient of expected inflation and the 
t-statistics are also generally larger in the different models. The 
coefficients of expected and unexpected inflation in the Fama-Schwert 
model were 1.19 and 0 .31 and the t-statistics were 7.4 and 2.8. The 
history of real estate in Southern California seems to bear out the fact 
that it is unexpected inflation ~fuch has had a more significant impact 
upon increases in housing prices (and thus upon rates of return) than 
expected inflation. Unexpected inflation was rather high in the years of 
1976-1979 when the realized rate of inflation was often as high or higher 
than expected inflation as measured by the rates on treasury bills . These 
were also the years of most rapid appreciation in housing prices. 
Expected inflation has been high in the years 1980-1982 when rates on 
treasury bills soared. Yet even though there was much expected infiation 
by this measure, there was little appreciation in houses. Unexpected 
inflation was negative during much of this time as interest rates were 
much higher than the realized rate of inflation. Thus the low 
(negative)ship level of unexpected inflation was closely correlated with 
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the low returns of 1980-1982. 
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FOOTNOTES 
( 1) One possibility is that an increase in the size of the federal deficit 
may cause higher real returns on treasury bills. The evidence 
on this is hardly conclusive, though. 
(2) One might think that there is some intrinsic value to homeownership 
above and beyond that yielded by the rental value of the horne. 
Such value would be difficult if not impossible to measure so it 
is ignored here. 
(3) I borrow this argument about missing data from Grether and 
Mieszkowski (p. 127). See their article for a more extended 
discussion. 
(4) This was changed to 1.% of the sales price after Proposition 13. 
(5) This functional form also has the advantage of not using any more 
degrees or freedom than the linear model. 
(6) It would be desirable to know the impact of students' scores on 
stands.rdized tests on real estate values . Pasadena, however, did 
not keep track of scores in a systematic way that would allow us 
to compare students' scores in a continuous series over the 
time period we are studying. There are two reasons for this. 
The first is that the type of test was changed in 1975. The 
second is that before 1975, the dates on which tests were 
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administered were not kept constant across the different years. 
Students will invariably do .worse on tests that are administered 
in the very beginning of the year and better later in the year. 
Because the tests were not administered at standardized times 
over this time period, comparisons of studnts' scores over this 
period are not particularly meaningful. Y.u. Bibiani, who is in 
charge of testing for the city, said that scores generally fell for 
all ethnic groups from 1970 - 1975; these were the first five 
years of school busing. Since 1975, the test scores have been 
rising for all ethnic groups. The table below shows this. 
Median Percentile Scores 
1975 through 1981 
CTBS and CAT 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
District 45 49 49 51 53 54 56 
Spanish-
surnamed 35 40 40 41 45 49 51 
Black 27 31 32 36 ?2 44 46 
White 65 69 70 72 69 72 76 
Others 68 71 69 73 74 76 78 
These figures are based on weighted median standard scores across all 
grade levels and subjects . They present an accurate depiction of trends 
within the district but do not conform to rigorous statistical practice. 
The test results in San Marino are kept confidential and not 
released. 
(7) The test of the hypothesis that B 1 = B2 = 0 is given by 
If- x n-k-1 F = .;;..;.__..;,;,__;-=---'..;;.__~ 
1-J?2x k 
which has an F distribution degrees of freedom k,n-k-1. See 
Madalla, p. 121. 
(B) Lenders may have had different expectations about future inflation 
than borrowers; perhaps this is why for several years 
unexpected inflation was high and housing prices increased. If 
this is so, then the expectations of borrowers would be 
somewhat more complicated than our model which depicts the 
expectations of both borrowers and lenders as reflected in the 
same treasury bill rates . Another possibility is that lenders 
were taking a longer term view of inflation than borrowers were. 
In this case, the relevant expectations of lenders might be 
different than the relevant expectations of borrowers. 
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APPEl't'DIX TABLE 1 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OYPER1 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAlS = 0.807744 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION= 0.183456 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 0.170986 
STANDARD DEVIATION= 0.184044 
R-SQUARED = 0.828109E-01 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.63784 7E-02 
F-STATISTIC( 2., 24.) = 1.08345 
LOG OF l.JKELIHOOD FUNCTION = 9.06484 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS= 27. 
SUM OF RESIDUALS = 0.29B023E-07 






ESTHI.tA TED STANDARD 
COEFF1C1ENT ERROR 





0 .~ 23599 
1.25980 
1.27671 
APPID-.TDIX TABLE 2 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OYPER2 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAIB = 0.780563 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSJON = 0.180343 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE= 0.148325 
STANDARD DEVIATION= 0.203556 
R-SQUARED = 0.275455 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.215076 
F-STATJSTlC( 5., 21.) = 4.56211 
LOG OF LIKELIHOOD FUNCTJON = 9.52694 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 27. 
SUM OF RESIDUALS = -0.2233517-07 
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR O.GAPS) = 1.1276 
RIGHT-HAND ESTIMATED STANDARD 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR 
C - .34330 4-E-0 1 0.1277779 
O_Y_EXPE 2.67879 1.7204-4 







APPENDIX TABLE 3 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OYPER7 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAlS = 1.33021 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION= 0.235426 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE= 0.113945 
STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.250497 
R-SQUARED = 0.184650 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.116704 
F-STATJSTIC( 2., 24.) = 2.71760 
LOG OF lJKElJHOOD FUNCTION = 2.33036 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS= 27. 
SUM OF RESIDUALS= 0.521541E-07 
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR O.GAPS) = 1.7998 
RIGHT-HA1\1D ESTIM.A.TED STANDARD 
ERROR 
T-
STATISTIC VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 










APPENDIX TABLE 4 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OYPER 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAlS = 3.07327 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSJON = 0.198497 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE= 0.144419 
STANDARD DEV1ATION = 0.213131 
R-SQUARED = 0.154299 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.132614 
F-STATISTIC( 2., 78.) = 7.11559 
LOG OF l.JKEI.JHOOD FUNCTION= 17.5701 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS= 81 . 
SUM OF RESIDUALS= 0.268221E-06 

















APPID-.TDIX TABLE 5 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OYREG 1 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAlS= 0.377910 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION = 0.125484 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE= 0.156723 
STANDARD DEVJATION = 0.133804 
R-SQUARED = 0.188143 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.120488 
F-STATISTIC( 2., 24.) = 2.78093 
LOG OF I.JKEUHOOD FUNCTION= 19.3193 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS= 27. 
SUM OF RESIDUALS= -0.154600E-06 
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR O.GAPS) = 0.8509 
RIGHT-HAND ESTIMATED STA.N'DARD 
ERROR 
T-
STATISTIC VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
C 0.1 72993 0.889095E-01 
O_Y_EXPE -0.150188 1.19710 





APPENDIX TABlE 6 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARIABlE: OYREG2 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAlS= 1.23011 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION = 0.226394 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABlE= 0.157783 
STANDARD DEVIATION= 0.238189 
R-SQUARED = 0.166074 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.965798E-01 
F-STATISTIC( 2., 24.) = 2.38976 
LOG OF l.JKElJHOOD FUNCTION = 3.38659 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS= 27. 
SUM OF RESIDUALS= -0.134110E-06 









c 0.168400 0.160408 
O_Y_EXPE -0.187484E-01 2.15976 




APPENDIX TABLE 7 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OYREG7 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAIB = 0.908804 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION= 0.194594 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE= 0.172243 
STANDARD DEVJATION = 0.208750 
R-SQUARED = 0.197873 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.131029 
F-STATISTIC( 2., 24.) = 2.96023 
LOG OF I.JKElJHOOD FUNCTION= 7.47340 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS= 27. 
SUM OF RESIDUALS= -0.178814E-06 
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR O.GAPS) = 1.5847 
















APPENDJX TABLE 8 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OYREG 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAlS= 2.78592 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION= 0.188989 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE= 0.162249 
STANDARD DEVIATION= 0.196138 
R-SQUARED = 0.947B07E-01 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.715700E-01 
F-STATISTIC( 2., 78.) = 4 .08348 
LOG OF LIKEUHOOD FUNCTION= 21.5457 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 81. 
SUM OF RESIDUALS= -0 .640750E-06 
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR O.GAPS) = 1.3644 
RIGHT-HA."ND ESTIJVJ..A TED 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 














APPENDIX TABLE 9 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: lDYREG 1 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAlS = 0.346760 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION= 0.120201 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE= 0.165464 
STANDARD DE\1ATION = 0.135104 
R-SQUARED = 0.269339 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.208450 
F-STATISTIC( 2., 24.) = 4 .42348 
l.DG OF I.JKEI.JHOOD FUNCTION = 20.4806 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS= 27. 
SUM OF RESIDUAlS= -0.819564E-07 






















APPENDIX TABLE 10 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARJABLE: LOYREG2 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAlS= 1.33136 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION = 0.235528 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE= 0.173011 
STANDARD DEVIATION= 0.269381 
R-SQUARED = 0.294355 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.235551 
F-STATISTIC( 2. , 24.) = 5.00572 
LOG OF I.JKELIHOOD FUNCTION= 2.31877 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS= 27. 
SUM OF RESIDUALS= -0.104308E-06 
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR O.GAPS) = 1.9088 















APPE:t-.11)IX TABLE 11 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IDYREG7 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAlS= 3.12972 
STANDARD ERROR OF THE REGRESSION= 0.361116 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE= 0.252183 
STANDARD DEVIATION= 0.353337 
R-SQUARED = 0.358290E-01 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = -0.445186E-01 
F-STATISTIC( 2., 24.) = 0.445925 
IDG OF l.JKEI.JHOOD FUNCTION = -9.22027 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS= 27. 
SUM OF RESIDUALS= -0.119209E-06 
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (ADJ. FOR O.GAPS) = 1.9558 
RIGHT-HAND ESTIMATED STANDARD T-
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 











APPENDIX TABLE 12 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
DEPENDEJ\T VARIABLE: LOYREG 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUAlS = 5.26035 
STANDARD ERROR OF TilE REGRESSION= 0.259693 
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 0.196886 
STANDARD DEVJATION = 0.267674 
R-SQUARED = 0.822732E-01 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED = 0.587416E-01 
F-STATISTIC( 2. , 78.) = 3.49631 
LOG OF l.JKElJHOOD FUNCTION= -4.19682 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS= 81. 
SUM OF RESIDUALS = -0 .864267E-06 



















EFFICIENT MARKETS, INTEREST RATES, AND REAL ESTATE 
I. Introduction and Literature Review 
In the past few years (1980-1982), interest rates have fluctuated 
widely. When the rates have gone up, they have increased the monthly 
housing payments that would be required if the principal on a loan 
remained constant. Because consumers' incomes are relatively fixed, the 
price of housing became soft after the rates went up. (In real terms, the 
price of housing went down for periods of time when the rates were very 
high). A natural question that poses itself is whether one could have done 
better than the market average by conditioning one's buying and selling 
of real estate upon the movement of home mortgage rates . If one had 
bought when the rates were high and prices were soft, and sold after 
rates had gone dovm and prices had gone up, would one have earned 
more than from following a buy and hold strategy- a strategy which said 
to buy real estate at the beginning of the time period in question, hold it 
to the end of the time period in question (irrespective of the movement of 
interest rates), and then sell it? This paper is designed to answer this 
question. 
If a market is working efficiently (in a sense that will shortly be made 
more precise), the market must be taking into account all available 
information. If the market were not taking into account all available 
information, it would be possible to condition one's buying and selling 
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upon this neglected information set and earn positive profits. In the case 
we are considering, the commodity in question is housing and the 
information set used to condition one's buying and selling upon is home 
mortgage rates. 
It is useful to formalize this concept of an efficient market. Let us 
define the class of expected return theories as follows: 
~ ~ 
E(F;,t+l I Zt) = [1 + E(r;.t+t I Zt)]p;t (1) 
where E is the expected value operator; P;t is the price of security j at 
time t; P; .t +l is its price at t+ 1 (with any cash income reinvested in the 
security); r;.t+l is the one period percentage return (pj.t+t -P;:)IP;:: Z: is 
a general symbol for whatever information is supposed to be reflected in 
the price at t; and the tildes indicate that P;.t+l and r;.t+l are random 
variables at t. Equation ( 1) tells us that the expected price of security j 
at time t+ 1 given the information set Z is equal to its price at timet plus 
its expected one period percentage return given Z times the price at t. 
The efficient market hypothesis tells us that it would not be possible 
to earn a net return that is in excess of the market equilibrium rate by 
condilioning one's buying and selling upon a particular information scl 
Let 
(2) 
x;.t+l is the return from conditioning one's purchase of j at time t+l on 
the basis of the information in Z at time t; it is the return from 
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speculating on the basis of the information set Z. A necessary condition 
for a market to be efficient is that 
Zj,t+J = 0. (3) 
It should be noted that even if we do positively ascertain that certain 
kinds of information have been incorporated into the real estate market, 
this does not enable us to positively say that the market is definitely 
efficient . For it may be that other bits of information are not being 
incorporated into the market. In effect we have another example of a 
point familiar from logic, viz ., one counter-example is sufficient to 
disprove a universally quantified statement but no list of examples is ever 
sufficient to prove a universally quantified statement. In this case, the 
universally quantified statement is the assertion that the market takes 
into account all relevant economic information. Thus even if we find that 
the market is taking into account the economic information that we test 
for, it might be the case that other information is not being taken into 
account; hence we would have some positive evidence that the market is 
efficient if we obtain positive tests but not conclusive evidence. That is , 
the expectation of what the price of commodity j will be at timet+ 1 must 
equal the conditional expectation of the price at time t+ 1 (when the 
expectation is conditioned on the information set Z) . For only in this 
case ·will equation (3) equal 0. (3) tells us that the sequence of returns 
[Aj1 ] is a "fair game" with respect to the information sequence [Zt) .1 
It should be noted that even if we do positively ascertain that certain 
kinds of information have been incorporated into the real estate market, 
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this does not enable us to positively say that the market is definitely 
efficient. For it may be that other bits of information are not being 
incorporated into the market. In effect we have another example of a 
point familiar from logic, viz., one counter-example is sufficient to 
disprove a universally quantified statement but no list of examples is ever 
sufficient to prove a universally quantified statement. In this case, the 
universally quantified statement is the assertion that the market takes 
into account all relevant economic information. Thus even if we find that 
the market is taking into account the economic information that we test 
for, it might be the case that other information is not being taken into 
account; hence we would have some positive evidence that the market is 
efficient if we obtain positive tests but not conclusive evidence. Our 
condition (3) should thus be thought of as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition. 
The above formulation of the "fair game" model is due to 
Samuelson2 and Mandelbrot.3 Although Bachelier4 had anticipated some 
of the results of the Samuelson-Mandelbrot (S-M) model, it V.'as not until 
lhe S-V. papers of 1965-1966 thal previous empirical studies received a 
rigorous theoretical underpinning . 
The characterization of market efficiency in terms of the conditional 
and unconditional expectation of price captures the notion that all 
available information is to be incorporated into the price of a commodity 
in an efficient market. If the information which was conditioned upon 
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yielded a better prediction of what tomorrow's price would be, then the 
traders in that market would not have taken that information into 
account. 
Kendall5 was one of the first to conduct an empirical efficient 
market test. He examined the effect of weekly changes in nineteen 
indices of British industrial share prices and in spot prices for cotton and 
wheat. After much analysis of possible serial correlations, Kendall 
concluded that these market were indeed efficient in that conditioning 
one's purchases upon past prices would not have enabled one to more 
accurately predict future prices and so earn a return in excess of the 
market . 
Sidney Alexander6 has performed efficient market tests for the stock 
market. Alexander studied certain trading rules which he called y% 
trading rules . An example of a y% trading rule would be a 3% trading rule. 
Such a rule would tell us that if a stock went up at least 3%, buy and hold 
the security until its price moves down at least 3% from a subsequent 
high, at which time simultaneously sell and go short. The short position 
is maintained until the price rises at least 3% above a subsequent low, at 
which time one covers the short position and buys. Thus the information 
set conditioned upon in this case is the past price behavior of the stock 
(including its highs and lows) . After extensively studying various y% 
filters. and then correcting for some initially incorrect assumptions. 
Alexander concludes in his final paper on the subject: 
ln fact, at this point 1 should advise any reader who is interested 
only in practical results, and who is not a floor trader and so 
must pay commissions, to turn to other sources on how to beat 
buy and hold. The rest of this article is devoted principally to a 
theoretical consideration of whether the
7
observed results are 
consistent with a random walk hypothesis. 
Alexander found that some profitability existed for the results of 
very small filters, i.e., filters in the range of 1% and under. The 
profitability of these small filters is inconsistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis but the profitability vanishes if one takes into account even 
the minimum trading costs that a floor trader must pay. Even a trader 
who owns his own seat on the New York Stock Exchange must pay a 
clearinghouse transaction on each trade that amounts to about .1% per 
turnaround transaction, i.e., sales plus purchase. Fama-Blume8 later 
showed that because such small filters produce such frequent trades, 
these minimum trading costs are sufficient to eliminate their advantage 
over a buy and hold strategy. 
The efficient market test in this paper differs from those done in the 
previous studies in two significant ways. The first is that this study deals 
with a non-uniform, differentiated commodity, i.e., housing. No two 
homes are exactly alike if only for the simple reason that they are not in 
exactly the same location. And as every real estate broker knows, there 
are three keys to the value of real estate - location. location, location. 
Houses will also differ in quality, age, quantity, etc. The previous efficient 
market studies have all dealt with standardized commodities. 
The previous definition of efficiency in (3) deals with the case of a 
homogenous commodity. Jn dealing v.ith a non-homogenous commodity, 
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it is necessary to control for the characteristics of the commodity. In 
this case, the condition for market efficiency becomes 
(4) 
where Zt represents characteristics of the house, and Rt represents any 
other information one might wish to condition upon. The condition I 
actually use to test efficiency in my model of differentiated commodities 
(in addition to (4)) is the implied condition that 
(5) 
where k is some lag, and Mt-k stands for lagged mortgage rates. 
It should be noted that if the model is misspecified, my tests do not 
bear only on the model of market efficiency. The conclusion that (5) 
tests market efficiency is valid only under the assumption that the model 
of price determination is specified correctly - or rather correctly 
specified to the extent that any omitted explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with the variable being conditioned upon. In my case, the 
explanatory variables are those of the square feet of the house, square 
feet of the lot, and the quality of location of the house. There are 
undoubtedly other omitted explanatory variables which would marginally 
improve one's ability to control for the characteristics of the house, e.g., 
the number of bathrooms in the house, the quality of kitchen, the 
presence of central heating and air conditioning. As long as these 
omitted variables are uncorrelated ~ith the variable being conditioned 
upon, viz., horne mortgage rates , the efficiency test is robust with respect 
to misspecification. As there is no good reason to think that these 
omitted variables are correlated with current or lagged interest rates, the 
problem of misspecification does not seem particularly troublesome. 
The second way in which this study differs from other market tests is 
that the agents in the real estate market are generally not the 
professionals that have been studied in the previous tests. Although 
there are undoubtedly a large number of very professional real estate 
brokers, a significant amount of the residential brokers work only part 
time as compared to the full time work of the professional security 
trader. It is also the case that many buyers do not use brokers but 
rather buy and sell their homes themselves. While it is no doubt the case 
that these buyers invest significant amounts of time educating 
themselves since this is probably the largest purchase of their lives, it is 
nevertheless the case that the expertise developed in two to six months of 
house hunting is not likely to match that generated by many years of full 
time work. It is probably not possible to exactly measure the amount of 
difference in the professionalization of the residential real estate market 
versus the financial securities market but there does seem nevertheless 
to be a difference. 
These two differences combine to lead one to suspect that if the 
efficient market hypothesis is to fail , it may well fail in the kind of market 
we are studying here. In his review article cited above, Fama discussed 
the generally successful confirmations of the efficient market hypothesis . 
86 
We might, however, expect the above two mentioned features to result in 
the efficient market hypothesis being falsified in the real estate market. 
Since the product is a differentiated one, it might be the case that agents 
do not possess very good information about the products and the prices 
of these products. 1t is certainly easier to possess complete and accurate 
information about a product when the product is the standardized type 
financial securities are . The fact that the economic agents in the real 
estate market are not as professional as the agents in the financial 
securities markets also might lead to the efficient market hypothesis 
being falsified. For it might be that these nonprofessional agents are not 
taking into account all the relevant information in deciding what the 
future prices will most likely be. 
11. Practical Considerations and Efficient Markets 
The information which I propose to examine is information about 
home mortgage rates. It is frequently said among real estate brokers 
that the time to buy is when real estate mortgages are high. When the 
rates have gone up, as they have so dramatically at times in the last few 
years. it is thought that sellers are begging for buyers and there are 
plenty of good buys out there . As evidence of this widespread viewpoint, 
let me quote the folloVting passage from a respected journal in the real 
estate profession written in 1982. 
Depressed market conditions allow buyers to purchase properly 
at 1980 prices. When interest rates begin to recede, the pent up 
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appreciation will increase dramatically. 
This concept of a buyer's market due to high interest rates is at odds 
with the economists' notion of an efficient market equilibrium in the real 
estate market. The economist who feels that there is an efficient market 
equilibrium in effect feels that the ordinary real estate broker can do 
both better and worse than he thinks he can. The broker can and will do 
worse than he thinks he can by buying in a "buyers" market because this 
information has already been taken into account by other brokers and so 
the profit opportunities the broker sees are really illusory. On the other 
hand, because brokers are efficiently taking advantage of all profit 
opportunities offered by speculation off movements in home mortgage 
rates, the economist at the same time thinks that brokers on average are 
doing a better job than the average broker thinks. The economist who 
believes there is an efficient market equilibrium thinks that brokers are 
doing such a good job on average that it will not be possible for the 
individual broker to profitably speculate from costlessly available 
information such as the influence of home mortgage rates. 
There is another possibility which we haven't considered yet. This is 
the possibility that our statistical study will show that it would have been 
possible to have earned positive profits by speculating on the movements 
of home mortgage rates but that this was so only because the market was 
not in equilibrium. There is nothing that prevents the market from 
adjusting to a new equilibrium in which there are no excess profits to be 
earned by speculating on the movement of interest rates, e .g., certain 
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classes are not barred from owning land so there is free entry into the 
field.1 0 
Til. The Data 
The data used in this study come from two di!Ierent sources. One 
source is the Southern California Real Estate Research Council. The 
quality of the home in this sample has been held constant throughout the 
last fifteen years for which there are recorded data. The prices have been 
compiled semi-annually for the years 1968 to 1982; these are the years 
being analyzed. I do not know how the location of the houses was kept 
constant because it would seem difficult to cover a broad area such as 
Los Angeles County and still keep the quality of location constant. I also 
do not know how much latitude was allowed for differences in the square 
footage and lot footage of the houses . (The Council does not make 
available to the public the micro data their averages are based upon.) It 
is doubtful they had exactly the same amount of these and I don't know 
the latitude allowed . 
The second data base was obtained from The Pasadena Board of 
Realtors Multiple Listing Books. The data were compiled quarterly-- from 
the second quarter of 1968 to the third quarter of 1982 -- in volumes 
which list what houses sold. 
There are six pieces of information collected on each transaction. 
These are the price for which the house sold, the number of square feet 
in the house , the number of square feet on the lot on which the house 
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rested, a rental price at which the house would have rented, the year in 
which the house sold, the interest rate on the mortgage of the house 
when it was bought, and a dummy variable for the quality of the area in 
which the house was located. 
The rental price was constructed for each house by regressing the 
rental price of houses that rented in each quarter in a given area upon a 
constant and the square feet of the houses . Rental prices for the houses 
that sold were then estimated by multiplying the number of square feet 
in their house times the rental coefficient of house square feet in that 
quarter and adding the constant of that quarter. 
There were two dummy variables used as indices of quality of 
location. Area 4 consisted of area 4 in the Pasadena Multiple Listing 
Book. This area is a predominantly lower income area with a significantly 
higher crime rate than the other area which was used, i.e ., area 7. The 
transactions which were used were those which came at the lower end of 
the price range in the MLS book; the MLS book is arranged with the 
houses which sold for the least amount of money in the beginning of the 
section and the transactions l compiled were always collected starting at 
the beginning of the section . Thus whilE: areas 4 and 7 are not perfectly 
homogenous within themselves in so far as the quality of area goes , the 
fact that the transactions were taken from the lower priced range of each 
area in every quarter serves to make the intra-area quality more uniform 
than it otherwise would be. 
One possible bias in the model exists because the houses which were 
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selected in the Pasadena areas were always selected from the lowest 
prices which sold. The reason for doing this is to make the neighborhood 
effect in each of the areas more uniform. The higher priced houses in the 
southeast Pasadena area are in a significantly nicer area than the lower 
priced houses . The higher priced houses consist of estate style homes in 
areas with wider and better maintained streets which also have better 
street lights . Thus in order to keep the neighborhood effect as uniform 
as possible, houses were selected from the lower priced houses which sold 
in both Pasadena areas . 
An adjusted price was constructed for each of the 1617 transactions 
which were recorded. This adjusted price was the cost in real terms 
(using the second quarter of 1968 as a base) of buying the house and 
paying the mortgage on it for a year plus the rental value of the house for 
a year. It was computed according to the following formula: 
P;.t - 12[.94renta.lv - (.85Pu x pptit )] + .02P,c (B) pit = ~----~------~--~--~~~~~--~~ 
d, 
Particularly to those unfamiliar v.'i.th the business of buying, renting, and 
then selling houses, the above e}."J)ression (6) may appear rather 
mysterious and ad hoc. In fact, however, it is the natural way to adjust 
the nominal selling price of a house to reflect the monetary effect of 
carrying the house for a year. If we take the actual price someone paid 
for a house to be his real economic cost of holding the house for a year, 
we would be making a mistake. For this cost of buying the home can be 
greater or smaller than the relevant economic cost depending upon 
whether or not the house yielded a positive or negative cash flow over the 
time period in question . The situation is analogous to determining the 
relevant price of a security on the stock market. 1f one stock yielded 
higher dividends than another stock even though both sold for the same 
prices over a one year period, they would not have the same relevant 
economic prices . The one with the higher dividend stream would have 
had a lower economic price at the beginning of the period because its net 
cost was lower than the other one (or alternatively one could say it had a 
higher economic price at the end of the period) . Similarly, if two houses 
sold for the same price over a one year period but one house had a higher 
cash flow than the other one, we would want to say that the house with 
the higher cash flow had a lower economic cost than the other house. 
This is the motivation for adjusting the data according to the formula in 
(6) . 
Let us now go through expression (6) term by term. P;,t is the price 
the ith house sold for in period t; rental;,t is the estirnsted rental value of 
that house, ppt;.t is the price per thousand dollars that an owner would 
have to pay per month on a loan amortized over thirty years . and dt is 
the deflator used for Lhe tth quarter to deflate the price into real terms 
with 1968 as the base year. lt is assumed that an individual makes a 
down payment of 15% which is why ppt is multiplied by only .85; since the 
individual made a down payment of .15, he is only paying interest on .85 
of the price . A management fee of 6% monthly rent is used which is why 
only 94% of the rent is allocated under positive cash flow. A property tax 
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rate of 2% of the sales price per year is used for the years 1968 to 1978; 
that is why .02 is added to the sales price in figuring out the cash fiow of 
the house for that year. (After the passage of propsition 13 in 1978 this 
figure is reduced to 1%.) Thus expression (6) is used to create for each 
house an adjusted price which is a price in constant dollars after taking 
into account the positive or negative cash fiow of the house for a one year 
period . 
N. The Estimation Procedure and the Hypothesis to Test 
In a data base involving both cross sections and time series (such as 
the one in this paper), it is necessary to test if the data can be pooled 
across cross sections and between time periods. The areas are quite 
distinct socioeconomically and casual observation of the coefficients from 
the different areas revealed they were significantly different . The 
follovring regressions were run which allowed the intercept and slope 
coefficients of each area to be ditJerent. These regressions enable us to 
determine whether it is permissible to pool the data across time. 
Pu = a1tD1u + a2tD2u + BJtDli.tHFu + B2tDzuHFit + 
BstDluLFu + B4tDzuLF'i.l. + Uu 
i = 1. . . . 30; t = 1. . . . 54 
(7) 
In the above expression, the net adjusted price which was calculated for 
each house from equation (6) is the dependent variable . The independent 
variables are respectively: the intercept term if the house is in area 1 at 
time t, the intercept term if the house is in area 2 at time t. the slope 
coefficient of house square feet if the house is in area 1 at time t, the 
slope coefficient of house square feet if the house is in area 2 at time t, 
the slope coefficient of lot square feet if the house is in area 1 at time t, 
the slope coefficient of lot square feet if the house is in area 2 at time t, 
and the error term. There are in general 30 observations in each quarter 
and so i runs from 1 to 30; there are 54 quarters and so t runs from 1 to 
54. 
The following regression was then run which pooled the data over 
time. 
P;. =a 1D1;. + a2D2;. + B1D1;.HF;. + B2D2;.HF;. + BsD1;.LFi, + 
B;.Dz;.LFi + ~ 
i=1, ... 1617 
(B) 
The following F test was used to determine if the data could be pooled 
over time. 
(9) 
ln Equation (9), 5 2 stands for the restricted residual sum of squares 
obtained from (B). 5 1 stands for the unrestricted residual sum of squares 
obtained from (7), r stands for the number of restrictions and equals (53 
x 6) = 31B, n is the number of observations and equals 1617, k is the 
number of explanatory variables in the unrestricted model and equals 
(54 x 6) = 324. The value of this F ratio is 30.04. The critical value at the 
95% level is 1.00 and so the data cannot be straightforwardly pooled . 
0 ,1 , , 
1t is not surprising that the data cannot be straightforwardly pooled 
because there has been an upward trend in real terms of California 
housing prices . To allow for this trend, I have run a regression (Equation 
1 0) which allows time to interact with each of the independent 
explanatory variables given in (7) . 
(10) 
When (B) is so re-run, the r-squared jumps from .4 7 to .82. See Tables 1 
and 2 for these results. 
In this context, a test or efficiency will be to see whether one could 
have done better by incorporating the information yielded by lagged 
values of real interest rates given the general upward trend of the last 
fifteen years. I have defined the real rate of interest to be the mortgage 
rate minus the rate of inflation over the last year . This real rate of 
interest will vary as the difference between mortgage rates and the rate of 
inflation varies . To test eff,ciency, I re-estimated (10) after including th e 
lagged real rate of interest as one of the explanatory variables as in 
( 11) 
If the coefficient on the lagged mortgage rate was not zero and was 
significant, the market would not be efficient. If the coefficient on the 
interest rate was not zero, then the unconditional expectation of housing 
prices would not equal the expectation given lagged mortgage rates, i.e., 
(12) 
where Mt-l stands for a value of lagged mortgage rates and Zt for the 
right hand side explanatory variables of (10) . Let 
Ah.t+l = E(ph,t+l I Zt.LAMt)- E(ph,t+1 I Zt) '# 0 (13) 
which is a violation of the efficiency condition given in (5) that 
Ah.t+1 = 0. (14) 
In order to r~:rrun ( 11) using an ordinary least squares approach 
with one of the explanatory variables now being lagged mortgage rates, 
and to test the nullity of the coefficient of the lagged mortgage rates, it is 
necessary to insure that direction of causality runs from the explanatory 
variables to the dependent variable . One of the assumptions of ordinairy 
least squares estimation is that the direction of causality is from the 
explanatory variables to the dependent variable . In the case we are 
considering , we must test to see if the dependent variable of the price of 
a house influences the explanatory variable of home mortgage rates. This 
may not seem a priori very likely but we still must test for this 
independence in order to insure the validity of the use of ordinary least 
squares . It also might be the case that a high price of housing causes a 
high mortgage rate because there is a greater amount of needed 
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financing when the price of housing rises . Thus although the likelihood 
that housing prices determine mortgage rates is not particularly strong a 
priori, it still is possible that they do so influence them and we must test 
for this in order to insure the validity of ordinary least squares. 
It is thus necessary to find an instrumental variable for mortgage 
rates in the Los Angeles area which is definitely not correlated with the 
housing prices in our sample but is highly correlated with the movement 
of Los Angeles area mortgage rates. In this regard I have selected the 
mortgage rates in the entire United States as an instrumental variable . It 
is necessary to regress the Los Angeles rate upon the U.S. rate and then 
to use the fitted value of the Los Angeles area rate from this regression. 
Thus (15) is the regression 
F 4 D2i.tLFu + F 4 'tD2uLFu + FfJ USMu --t +wit 
where LAMu =LAM: and USMit = USM: for all i. 
(15) 
( ll ) is now run using lh e fitted values of the LA rate obtained from 
(15) as in Equation (16) 
(16) 
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From ( 11) and ( 16) we obtain the estimated coefficients and standard 
errors of the L.A. rate and the fitted -value of the LA. rate. From these we 
compute the following statistic which has a chi-square distribution with 1 
degree of freedom: 
(17) 
and where VarB6 and VarB!l stand for (respectively) the variances of the 
LA. rate and the fitted value of the L.A. rate. If we accept the hypothesis 
that the dependent variable of housing prices does not influence the 
explanatory variables, then we can use the L.A. rate in an efficiency 
test.12 Equation ( 1 7) is the statistic which allows us to determine if the 
direction of causality runs in the appropriate direction. 
The estimation procedure used for the data base provided by the 
Southern California Real Estate Research Council is similar. To allow for 
a time trend, I first estimated the equation 
( 1 B) 
An efficiency te st in th is context is to then estimate 
(19) 
and to see if the coefficient B2 is non-zero and significant. This is in 
accord with the criteria we ere using for efficiency with a homogenous 
product (because since we ere not given any of the particular 
characteristics of houses it is assumed they are the same) which is that 
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E(Pt+l I p,) = E(pt+l I p,,R,). (20) 
Equation ( 19) is then re-run using t~e fitted value of B2 which is obtained 
from the equation 
LAM, -1c = c + dp, -1c + e USJJ,-~: + wt . (21) 
The final step is to compare the estimated coefficients and variances as in 
(17). 
V. Results and Conclusion 
The key results of my study are contained in Tables 3, 4, and5. Table 
3 shows the coefficient of the real rate lagged six months to be negative 
and not significant at the 75% level. Tables 4 and 5 are of interest 
because they show the coefficient of the real rate lagged 12 and 18 
months (respectively) to be both negative and significant at the 99% level. 
The coefficient on the real mortgage rate lagged 12 months is minus 421.7 
and the t-statistic is -3.917. Thus for every one point decrease in the 
lagged 12 month mortgage rates, the price of a house jumped $421.70. 
Vt'hen one considers that most of the houses in 1968 sold between 
$ 10,000.00 and $27,000 .00 (depending on the area, size of the house and 
lot), an increase of $421.70 for every one point decrease in the real lagged 
12 month mortgage rate is rather significant. (The prices of the other 
years were deflated into 1968 dollars and so this coefficient is also 
noteworthy for them too .) Table 5 shows the coefficient on the real rate 
lagged 18 months to be -360.1. This is also noteworthy. 
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The results of Tables 4 and 5 comprise a refutation of the efficient 
market hypothesis in the real estate market in that one could have done 
better than the market average by conditioning upon lagged real interest 
rates of 12 and 18 months; the market did not fully take this information 
into account. When these rates are low, it has been established that 
prices will be higher in the next twelve to eighteen months than they 
otherwise would be. lf a speculator were trying to figure out when to buy 
houses, he would have been better able to better predict the prices of 
houses by looking at lagged interest rates than merely by looking at the 
past price of housing. The predictions of future prices of this speculator 
who was conditioning his predictions upon lagged real mortgage rates (as 
well as the characteristics of the houses and the past price of housing) 
would have been systematically better than the market's predictions 
which did not incorporate this information about lagged real mortgage 
rates into current housing prices. Since this information wasn't 
incorporated into the price of housing, the market wasn't fully 
efficient. 13 
Jn the case of this paper, l can think of two real world factors which 
might complicate and possibly change the inefficiency result of this 
paper. (as they did in Alexander's later work). The fact that my model 
does not deal with these factors could lead to possible misspecification in 
the model. One factor is that the transaction costs of selling of 
approximately 6% were not explicitly considered in this paper. My model 
does not explicitly say when (or how often) one should have bought and 
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sold real estate. Thus it is not possible to say how much more often (if at 
all) the brokerage commission of 6% would have been assessed if one had 
conditioned one's purchases upon lagged real interest rates . 
The second factor is that the effects of the tax system have not been 
considered in this paper. It was not possible to obtain data on the 
income tax brackets of the owners of the houses and so the after tax 
prices of buying a house and holding it for a year were not computed; 
only the before tax price was computed. It is possible that if this 
different set of prices was used, market efficiency could possibly result . 
In the second data set, the coefficient on lagged real interest rates 
was never significant at the 90% level. In the Riverside-San Bernadino 
area, the coefficient on lagged real rates of 18 months was -94.17 and the 
t-statistic was -1.27 when the required critical value at the 90% level is 
1.31 . That was the closest the t-statistic came to being significant . 
The results of the first micro data set should be viewed wi.th more 
confidence than the results of the aggregated data set for two reasons. 
First, the micro-data set explicitly controlled for variations in the quality 
of the houses in the sample . We can hope that by controlling the sample 
of houses in the aggregate data set, the variation in house quality was 
controlled for but since there must have been some variation in the 
sample (in terms of location, house square feet, and lot square feet), this 
control wi.ll not have been perfect. Second, the prices in the aggregated 
data set do not take into account the positive or negative cash flow of the 
house since there were no estimated rental prices in the aggregated data 
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of the Southern California Real Estate Research Council. These two 
reasons lead one to have more confidence in the micro data set. 
It is of interest that the test for the exogeneity of the L.A. rate 
showed that the L.A. rate was rightly considered exogenous in all of the 16 
regressions that were run on this data . The values of the test specified in 
Equation (20) are given in Table 6 . The critical value for rejecting the 
exogeneity of the L.A. rate at the 95% level is 3.84. As can be seen by 
examining the table, it was permissable to accept the L.A. rate as 
exogenous in every one of the tests; the largest value achieved was .05. 
This provides some support for taking the L.A. rate as exogenous in our 
first data base . It also seems empirically plausible that the prices of the 
group of 1617 houses in our survey did not affect the L.A. interest rate. 
The exogeneity of the L.A. rate thus seems to be a rather uncontroversial 
assumption.14 
Another possibility which deserves mention is that the market we 
have studied here may have been in temporary disequiibrium during the 
period we studied. The period we studied was one in which inflation was 
at relatively low levels at the beginning of the period and at relatively high 
level s at the end of the period . This resulted in moderate real rates of 
interest at the beginning of the period in question and then resulted in 
rather low or negative rates of real interest in the period of the mid to 
late 1970's. Real rates of interest then rose to rather high levels after 
inflation subsided in 1981 and 1982. It may be that the market was in 
temporary disequilibrium during this period and that the participants in 
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the market had not had time to learn about the effect of real rates of 
inflation (rather than the case that long run, repeated profit 
opportunities were being missed.) 
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FOOTNOTES 
This paper has benefited significantly from the comments of 
Burl Klein, Bruce Cain, Jeff Dubin, and especially Quang Vuong. 
(1) This is the notion of an efficient market characterized as a fair game 
given in Fama's "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work," Journal of Pinn.nce, 1970, pp. 385-386. 
(2) Paul Samuelson, "Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate 
Randomly," .lnri.ustrial Management Review, Spring, 1965. 
(3) Benoit Mandelbrot, "Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, 
and Martingale Models," Journal of Business, January 1966. 
( 4) Louis Bachelier, "Theorie de la Speculation," Paris, 1900. 
(5) Maurice G. Kendall, "The Analysis of Economic Time-Series, Part 1: 
Prices," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1953. 
(6) Sidney Alexander, "Price V.ovemenls in Speculative Markets : Trends 
or Random Walks ," Jnri.ustrial Management Review, }.~ ay 1961. 
(7) Ibid., pp . 338-372. 
(B) Eugene Fama and Marshall Blume, "Filler Rules and Stock Market 
Trading Profits ," Journal of Business, January 1966. 
(9) Keith Kube, "Buy Now Because ... " Real &tate Today, April 1982. 
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( 1 0) See also, however, the possibility of misspecification discussed in the 
conclusion. 
( 11) In future test of the real estate market, it might make more sense to 
investigate if the dependent variable of house square feet can 
rightly be taken as exogenous. Many say that the current high 
price of housing has caused a number of square feet in a house 
to decrease; thus the exogeneity of this variable might also be 
questioned. Fortunately no one has speculated that this trend 
has taken place over the last 15 years and so its future 
possibility would not seem to affect this study. 
(12) See "Specification Tests in Econometrics," by J . A. Hausman, 
Econometrica, November 1978, pp . 1251-1273. 
(13) There are other interesting tests that one could have done for 
efficiency. In particular, Jeff Dubin has pointed out that one 
could test for the joint effect of lagged real rates of six, twelve, 
and eighteen months . For our purposes, however. testing these 
in isola tion has been sufficient because even when tested in 
isola tion the lagged rates of twelve and eighteen months reveal 
the market to be inefficient. 
(14) Given the low a priori probability that the L.A. rate was not 
exogenous, and the results of the exogeneity test mentioned in 
the paper, an exogeneity test was not run on the sample of the 
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Pasadena Board of Realtors. 
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TABLE 1 
Dependent variable is adjp 
Right-hand variables: houseftl houseft2 lotftl lotft2 
areal area2 
Variable Name Estimated Coefficient Standard Error 
houseftl 1.525 1.680 0.9076 
houseft2 22.62 1.025 22.06 
lotftl 0.03321 0.1150 0.2889 
lotft2 2.981 0.2084 14.30 
areal 12250.0 1890.0 6.483 
area2 -22910 .0 1606.0 -14.26 
r-squared = 0 .4714 
number of observations 
sum of squared residuals 
standard error of the regression 
= 1617 





Dependent variable is ·adjp 
Right-hand variables: houseft1 houseftl t houseft2 houseft2t 
lotft1 lotftlt lotrt2 lotft2t 
areal areal t area2 area2t 
Variable Name Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic 
houseftl 7.257 2.084 3.482 
houseftlt -0.1298 0.06441 -2.016 
houseft2 -14.05 1.252 -11 .22 
houseft2t 1.117 0.03569 31.29 
lotft1 0.02470 0.1688 0.1463 
lotftl t 0.000945 0.005841 0.1663 
lotft2 0.5442 0.2472 2.202 
lolft2t 0.0207 0.006785 3.055 
areal -1393.0 2405.0 -0.5793 
area1t 382.0 69 .34 5.509 
area2 21220.0 2156.0 9.842 
area2l -9:1.6 52.? 1 -17.38 
r-squared = 0.8199 
number of observations = 1617 
sum of squared residuals = 0.1318 X 1012 
standard error of the regressions = 9063.0 
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TABLE 3 
Dependent variable is adjp 
Right-hand variables: houseft1 houseftlt houseft2 houseft2t 
lotftl lotftl t lotft2 lotft2t 
area 1 area 1 t area2 area2t 
lagrate 






lotft1 t 0.0009493 
lotft2 0.5446 
lotft2t 0.02076 
area l -1282.0 





number of observations 









2424.0 -0 .5288 
69 .46 5.479 




= 16 17 
= 0.1318 X 1012 
T-Statistic 
! 11 
standard error of the regression = 9066.0 
11 2 
TABLE 4 
Dependent variable is -adjp 
Right-hand variables: houseft1 bouseftl t bouseft2 bouseft2t 
lotftl lotftlt lotft2 lotft2t 
areal arealt area2 area2t 
lagrate4 
Variable Name Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic 
bouseftl 7.246 2.075 3.493 
houseftlt -0.1351 0 .06414 -2.122 
houseft2 -14.27 1.248 -11.43 
houseft2t 1.120 0.03554 31.52 
lotftl 0.04189 0.1681 0 .2493 
lotftlt 0.00003098 0.005820 0.005323 
lotft2 0.5319 0.2461 2.162 
lotft2t 0.02102 0.006755 3.112 
areal 269.3 2432 .0 0.1108 
area1l 359.3 69.27 5.188 
area2 2334-0.0 22 ~4 0 10.54-
area2t -951.9 53.21 -17 .89 
lagrate4 -421.7 107.7 -3.917 
r-squared = 0.8216 
number of observations 
sum of squared residuals 
= 1617 
= 0 .1 306 X 1012 
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standard error of the regressions = 9023.0 
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TABLE 5 
Dependent variable is adjp 
Right-hand variables: houseftl houseftl t houseft2 houseft2t 
lotrtl lotftl t lotft2 lotft2t 
areal arealt area2 area2t 
lagrate6 















number of observations 
sum of squared residuals 
2.079 3.450 














= 0.1310 X 1012 
T-Stalistic 
11 5 
standard error of the regressions = 9038.0 
11 6 
Seven County Area 
RLA( -2) .002 
RLA(-4) .015 
RLA( -6) .006 
Los Angeles County 
RLA(-2) .001 
RLA( -4) .003 




RLA( -6) .015 
TABLE 6 
Riverside and San Bernadino 
RLA.( -2) .004 
RLA(-4) .026 
RLA( -6) .042 
